Title: Privileged and Confidential
Author: Kenneth Michael Absher
Absher, Kenneth Michael (2012), Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk. Privileged and Confidential: The Secret History of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky
- Introduction: the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board: learning lessons from its past to shape its future — Dwight D. Eisenhower — John F. Kennedy — Lyndon B. Johnson — Richard M. Nixon — Gerald R. Ford/Jimmy Carter — Ronald W. Reagan — George H. W. Bush — William J. Clinton — George W. Bush — Conclusion — Biographical sketches of PIAB members.
Date Updated: November 30, 2015
Reviewed by Cynthia M. Nolan.
A good story has many elements. An interesting setting. Good characters. A disciplined structure. Finally, a plot with a compelling conflict and resolution.
Privileged and Confidential has all the elements of a good story. Its authors, Kenneth Michael Absher, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk, call their work the fascinating history of the “most secretive, least-well known, and potentially most influential” part of the Intelligence Community (IC). Nonetheless, after 409 pages of narrative (including appendices), the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) unfortunately remains elusive. In places, a lack of details makes the PIAB and its projects hard to discern. In others, an abundance of details drowns the authors’ objectives and may even make the PIAB less interesting than promised. At the end, the authors’ analysis and conclusions present some compelling conflicts, and interesting lessons.
The strengths and deficiencies of Privileged and Confidential reveal the promise and the perils of writing about the secret side of government. Absher, Desch, and Popadiuk have written the first history of the PIAB. They have tirelessly culled together disparate parts of dusty government archives to reveal everything that they could find.
This academic treatment of the PIAB is categorized and structured through successive presidential administrations. The book’s main goals are to: delineate the areas in which the PIAB may be helpful to any future Presidents; illuminate the PIAB’s history; better acquaint the public with the role of intelligence in presidential decisionmaking; explore the contribution of outside advisory boards to the White House; and help to answer the question of how or why the PIAB (and indeed any outside advisory board) is successful—or not.
The answer to the last question is the one most clearly sought. First, the authors evaluate the question of a President’s personality and preferences in his use of the PIAB. In other words, if a President is inclined to complex organizational theories, then perhaps the PIAB will be well used and highly successful. If a President prefers informal advice, the question is raised whether the PIAB will be unsuccessful.
Second, the authors affirm the overall growth in power of the presidency, then ask how the growth of power in the executive branch over the last half of the 20th century affected the PIAB’s effectiveness. In other words, does the PIAB benefit from that growth or suffer from it, in that it may get overlooked when other offices, organizations, and agencies take over the duty of intelligence advice and oversight? Borrowing from I. M. Destler: as the complexity of government increases, the role of outsiders decreases. The PIAB was created to be a group of outside advisors to the President. The authors attempt to answer how it will evolve in this increasingly complex environment, and who or what will drive the evolution.
The PIAB was created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) in 1956. Eisenhower liked independent boards of consultants and had already formed a few others. With congressional talk of developing a joint committee to oversee the intelligence agencies and the support of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles, a civilian intelligence committee was born. The new Board preceded the creation of congressional oversight committees by almost twenty years; in the interim the Board greatly influenced the early years of U.S. government intelligence agencies.
The PBCFIA made 42 written recommendations to Eisenhower regarding the coordination, appraisal, growth, and capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Eisenhower acted on 37 of them, approving 33. By the end of his administration, the intelligence agencies had implemented 15. Five recommendations were forwarded to the incoming Kennedy administration as Eisenhower was leaving office.
The PBCFIA fulfilled its original mission to improve the governance of the intelligence apparatus. Responses to its reports were generally positive in all arenas. In fact, Eisenhower’s support for technological and scientific improvements in government lent credibility and openness to the PBCFIA’s reports. Indeed, Eisenhower was intensely interested in intelligence, and these early days of the community gave the PBCFIA a unique influence which has never been repeated.
President John F. Kennedy found Eisenhower’s system of multiple outside advisory boards too complex. He preferred an informal system that would encourage spontaneous discussions across disciplines. As such, the PBCFIA under Kennedy began to wither on the vine. Then the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored invasion of Fidel Castro’s new republic by a group of Cuban émigrés at the Bay of Pigs spectacularly and publicly failed in April 1961. As a result, reconstituting an oversight Board for intelligence took on more urgency.
The new Board first met with Kennedy on 15 May 1961. In reality, Kennedy’s advisors had been proceeding to reestablish or reconstitute the PBCFIA before these events, but the new President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) addressed a need for original oversight and advice on intelligence. Indeed, it is widely argued that of all the Presidents, Kennedy benefited the most from his use of the intelligence board.
Considering his initial dislike of the formal Board, that Kennedy tasked the PFIAB with multiple assignments covering a diverse slate of problem areas is surprising. His insistence on flexibility for Board members’ research, along with granting the Board members unfettered access to the most senior levels of national security, made the PFIAB very successful. Most importantly, it aided in preventing what had been Kennedy’s main problem early in his administration: intelligence failures. The PFIAB was very active during the short Kennedy administration. The Board submitted 170 recommendations; 125 were approved, and 85 were completed. Forty-three were, necessarily deferred to the next administration.
Because the PFIAB proved so helpful under Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson, upon unexpectedly inheriting Kennedy’s Board, had no intention to disband or radically change it. During Johnson’s administration, the PFIAB conducted major studies of long-term intelligence issues which included the state of intelligence support to the President, U.S. early warning capabilities, comparative military capabilities, intelligence reconnaissance, applications of science and technology to intelligence operations, and information handling. The PFIAB also reviewed some short-term intelligence issues such as counterintelligence, building the Moscow embassy and improved reporting on Vietnam.
The authors credit the success of the Johnson PFIAB to the diversity of issues it addressed. The urgency and necessity of movement on these long-term and short-term issues, and the IC’s receptiveness to recommendations from the PFIAB contributed to its success. Although the Board rarely met with President Johnson, his close relationship with Board Chairman Clark M. Clifford meant that the PFIAB deserved and received respect and attention from the rest of the national security apparatus.
The PFIAB’ s meeting agendas and other official records remain are unavailable for the Nixon Administration, but the authors give their general impressions of its status during those years based on available correspondence, Executive Orders, public statements, and other letters. In general, President Richard M. Nixon was ambivalent toward the PFIAB. He was initially supportive, but increasing distractions led to his almost completely ignoring the organization by the end of his years in office.
The Nixon PFIAB advised the President on the objectives, conduct, management, and coordination of the overall intelligence effort, focusing especially on intelligence analysis, the Soviet threat, economic intelligence, and the organization of the Intelligence Community. But, these very significant and important topics were overshadowed by politics in the White House. Under Nixon, frequent turnover, a wide diversity of expertise, and some personality clashes between the PFIAB and the rest of the administration added to the White House’s insularity causing the PFIAB’s influence in the area of intelligence to diminish over time.
President Gerald R. Ford Jr. took over the PFIAB during a time of not only great political upheaval but also during a significant transition in the area of intelligence oversight. The intelligence field was moving from a general sense of ambivalence and isolation to greater government oversight from both from Congress and the White House. As a result, the PFIAB was challenged to increase and improve oversight while avoiding the appearance of redundancy with the newly-established Senate and House oversight committees, SSCI and HPSCI, formed in 1976 and 1977 respectively.
In 1976, after much debate in the Intelligence Community and in public oversight reports, the PFIAB retained its status as a part-time advisory board, while the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) was created to focus on legal oversight challenges to the intelligence agencies. The PFIAB survived debates to disband or reorganize it, but found itself politicized by the 1976 Team A/Team B experiment in alternative analysis. Political leaders from the Right side of the spectrum had been publicly criticizing the CIA for years, and had “convinced themselves that the National Intelligence Estimates were underestimating the Soviet threat [and so] they cast about for an entry point to challenge the official estimates. They found a ready-made vehicle: … The PFIAB.” Whether this experiment was a good political idea or not, the PFIAB was considerably weakened.
The tumult and babble over how to address the intelligence scandals of the early 1970s temporarily resulted in the elimination of the PFIAB under President Jimmy Carter. The President threw out what he thought was a political agency adding to the bloat of the executive branch. He retained the IOB in order to emphasize oversight of intelligence, but Carter lost the PFIAB’s independent advice.
As the PIAB Board Chair under President Ford, Leo Cherne, said, “Unless the President actively understands [the] Board, [its] functions are minimal, and its friends are few.” Obviously, the PFIAB’s elimination diminished its relevance, but asserting that the Board’s effectiveness decreased is difficult. Because its potency depends on its relationship to the President, the Board was ironically preserved by Carter’s opposition. Had he kept but ignored it, the Board’s reputation would have diminished considerably. But because he chose to disband the PFIAB and elevate the IOB, Carter preserved the function of intelligence oversight at the White House.
Candidate Ronald Reagan used the PFIAB’s disappearance to paint Carter as a foreign policy know-nothing. After the election, despite support for the PFIAB from his national security advisors, President Reagan himself proceeded to staff the Board with political cronies, thus cementing the view that the advisory position was nothing more than a political plum.
Following the “Halloween Massacre” of 1985, when Reagan fired 11 PFIAB members after negative newspaper accounts of a bloated and unruly Board, the President gave his advisors a smaller list of issues to address. A more productive and competent PFIAB emerged. The obvious and lasting lesson from Reagan’s two-sided approach to the PFIAB is that smaller (and less political) is better.
President George H. W. Bush initially ignored the PFIAB, allowing its members to stay and complete tasks started during the previous administration. In 1989, he moved to streamline the Board’s membership and scope following the recommendations of some foreign policy advisors. Following a minor controversy involving the possible appointment of Henry Kissinger, a small, nonpartisan, expert Board emerged.
Detailed reports of the Bush administration’s are unavailable, but quite clearly the small number of technical issues on which the PFIAB did make recommendations to the President reflected a diminished respect for its work within the executive branch. The Board did not have much access to Bush and very little political clout, despite his previous tenure as Director of Central Intelligence under President Ford.
President Bill Clinton turned to the tried and true tactic of making membership on the PFIAB compensation for political favors, public support, and even political mistakes. Clinton also made the IOB a standing committee of the PFIAB, thus making the more politically and practically palatable oversight board part of the less respected one. Not much changed from previous administrations.
High turnover—21 people served on the PFIAB over the eight-year Clinton administration—reflected the· Board’s irrelevance. In general, Clinton was uninterested in intelligence and largely indifferent to his intelligence advisors. In fact, as far as the authors could tell from the limited reports, memos, and agendas available to them, the President never met with the Board. Eighty-five reports were produced from 1993 to 2001. Not one has been declassified.
Yet, under President Clinton, two PFIAB reports were public from the time of their production: The Report on Guatemala Review (actually an IOB report), and Science at Its Best, Security at Its Worst. These reports helped form the public’s response to two counterintelligence scandals that emerged early in the Clinton administration. Well researched and clearly argued, the reports, however commendable, nonetheless represented a political reality for the PFIAB. The President could use them however he liked: for political cronies and public mea culpas or for expert advice and serious research.
President George W. Bush initially ignored the PFIAB, as his father, President George H. W. Bush, had. Even after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the President’s main advisory group on intelligence matters lay dormant. President Bush continued to appoint political associates for membership. The authors admit that so little is known about the issues, recommendations, and activities of the PIAB (renamed in 2008) that drawing conclusions about what seemed to be a very political and partisan advisory Board under Bush, with even higher turnover than under President Clinton, was difficult.
Absher, Desch, and Popadiuk do not cover much of President Barack Obama’s administration. However, a quick search on the Internet shows that as of 2013, there are four PIAB members on the Obama Board. All four members of the PIAB are also the members of the IOB. Thus Obama appears to be following the advice of this book in terms of size. However, no recommendations were formally institutionalized as the authors recommend. And, it is unclear why Obama chose these four members for the board. Indeed, as of 2012, he had 14 people on his board, many of them were very prominent participants in the academic and congressional roles that revolve around the IC. It is unclear why there was such a large defection. So without further data, we can only speculate that Obama wants to reshuffle his intelligence priorities, perhaps in light of big IC challenges such as the Snowden leak, controversies over NSA, the use of drones, and the future of various commitments overseas.
This is a big exodus, and it does seem to say that Obama has no use for the PIAB or the IOB. Certainly these controversies are exactly the kind of topics that the PIAB has tackled in the past. Indeed, what will be the board’s future? Will the White House follow the advice of Absher and his colleagues and give the Board a formal, strengthened role in the IC? Does the Obama administration see the need for a fresh perspective outside of existing bureaucratic channels? At this point, we don’t know. Future researchers will have to follow Absher’s, Desch’s, and Popadiuk’s path to tell us.
THE BOOK’S STRUCTURE
The secondary characters in Privileged and Confidential are the actual PIAB members. The authors have structured the book to focus on the Presidents even while asserting that the presidential personalities are less important determinants in the PIAB’s success than is the bureaucratic growth of the White House. Thus, the biographical sketches of the PIAB’s members are placed in the back of the book.
Each chapter introduces a President’s relationship to intelligence in general, then breaks down the PIAB history during his term into: Board membership and executive staff, member selection process, PIAB staff, operating procedures, PIAB meetings, issues and recommendations, an assessment, and future research recommendations.
The lists and details from the reports and correspondence which were available to the authors become somewhat repetitive. This stilted structure eliminates all possibility of drama in this “secret history.” The authors hint at interesting personality clashes, political machinations, and intrigues behind the scenes, and a haphazard-sometimes successful, sometimes not-board selection process. Some dramatic stories should be in there somewhere, but perhaps the authors are saving those for another book.
Yet, this detailed succession of Board reports may not be the fault of the authors. They drum up every possible synonym for “report” when describing what the PIAB does. Therefore the Board issues reports, reviews, research, analysis, records, assessments, memos, studies, briefings, and recommendations-for more information or further study-using committees, working groups, meetings, more briefings, panels, and on-site reviews and travel.
The minutiae of this list become even more apparent when unavailable. The book is actually more accessible when the authors have less information available to them. More information leads to more lists, but unfortunately not more insights into the book’s main goals: explaining what makes the PIAB successful. Indeed, most detailed classified reports from the last four or five administrations were not available, forcing Absher and his colleagues to rely on interviews and public accounts. Thus, the more succinct narrative of the latter half of the PIAB’s history is much more focused than are the detailed chronicles of the earlier administrations.
The “plot” of Privileged and Confidential is fairly obvious from the start. The intention was to detail the history of the PIAB from administration to administration as the authors tried to discover what makes a successful Board. First comes the definition of success. If the PIAB because of the useful expertise and careful research of its members, provides valuable advice and recommendations for the President, then it can be called successful. By that measure; only Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Ford truly benefited from the PIAB. Carter disbanded the Board, and every other President has used it with mixed success.
Second, is success driven by the President or by structure of the intelligence apparatus—and the government bureaucracy—itself?” The authors find analysis through the lens of presidential style an unsatisfying explanation because it does not reckon with changes and mixed results within the same administration. President Reagan, for instance, initially approached the PIAB with a political bent, but he eventually turned the Board into a source of very useful advice. Reagan’s personality did not change in the middle of his administration but the Board’s success did. The institutionalization of the government bureaucracy to include the Intelligence Community and the White House itself means that government-outside of the PIAB-is more autonomous, more adaptable, more complex, and more focused. Therefore, the President does not particularly need guidance and advice from outside the normal bureaucracy. Thus, unique and changing issues, opportunities, and personalities-different from presidential styles-unduly influence the usefulness of the Board.
Finally, why should the public care about the PIAB’s performance? That a semi-independent, semi-secret, non-partisan, part-time, volunteer, advisory working group can last for more than 50 years-with a short time off during the Carter years-is highly unique, definitely rare, and frankly astonishing. That achievement alone is worth studying. But the authors make a less than convincing case that, even with a committed leadership, the PIAB could play an important role in shaping the Intelligence Community.
Absher, Desch, and Popadiuk make nineteen recommendations to improve the. PIAB’s usefulness. Having concluded that, in general, the PIAB’s value to the President through the provision of effective, important, independent advice decreases as bureaucracy increases, they seek to counter that trend. In general, they recommend that the PIAB be formalized, believing that the flexibility that comes with a new administration’s whims must be formally subjected subject to overall best practices. Their recommendations include formalizing communication lines and follow-up procedures, setting fixed criteria for board membership, qualifications, and timing, and giving the panel more authority.
The PIAB’s detractors argue that its functions are duplicative; every activity, interview, and report could be conducted elsewhere in the government. Nonetheless, the authors argue that advice which comes from outside the government can be very useful to the President. Although every administration after Kennedy’s has used the PIAB with only mixed success, all but Carter’s retained the PIAB. But even Carter belatedly came to realize that he could use the PIAB to his advantage. Thus, the authors conclude that improving the PIAB’s usefulness for the future is well worthwhile.
PROMISE AND PERIL
All told, the depth of Privileged and Confidential makes it a highly valuable look into the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Kenneth Michael Absher, Michael C. Desch, and Roman Popadiuk have contributed truly new and original research to the academic library on intelligence. They have unearthed heretofore unknown details on the PIAB’s inner workings, on its presidential relationships, and on the member selection process.
Their treatment of the PIAB also shows the perils of writing about the secret side of government since they had to occasionally admit that certain information remains unobtainable. Therefore, they are unable to both analyze still classified data or draw firm conclusions about the PIAB’s effectiveness.
Consequently, their analysis tends to get bogged down in the classified areas of research. While the book seeks to discover what makes the PIAB successful, it sometimes gets lost in—surprisingly—too much detail. Due to a surfeit of still classified documents, Absher and his colleagues seem to delight in the details that they do find, leading to a focus on minutiae that are not always relevant to the main issue of determining the PIAB’s effectiveness.
Ultimately, these deficiencies are unimportant. A history of the PIAB has never before been published, making this book valuable. Presumably the next book on the PIAB will build on this one, and perhaps be even better.
Reviewed by Joseph C. Goulden
Since the Eisenhower administration, every president with the exception of Jimmy Carter has made varying use of an outside advisory panel that authors Kenneth Michael Absher, Michael C. Desch and Roman Popadiuk term “one of the smallest, most secretive, least well-known, but potentially influential parts of the U.S. intelligence community.”
During most of its existence, the body was known as the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, or PFIAB. In 2008, during the post-Sept. 11 restructuring of the intelligence establishment, the name was changed to the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, which continues to be used under President Obama.
Because of the highly classified material with which it deals, the board is by nature secretive. It also operates under a blanket of executive privilege that President Eisenhower articulated in a 1958 letter to Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson in denying a request to access PFIAB materials: “From time to time the President invites groups of specially qualified citizens to advise him on complex problems. These groups give the advice after intensive study, with the understanding that their advice will be kept confidential. Only by preserving the confidential nature of such advice is it possible to assemble such groups or for the President to avail himself of such advice.”
Long-term board member (and chairman, 1981-90) Leo Cherne repeatedly emphasized to colleagues “that PFIAB was special because it was the one part of the U.S. government that never leaked.” He regularly refused to cooperate with investigations of the PFIAB by other parts of the intelligence community and the congressional oversight committees.
Given these strictures, the authors of this book worked with a very thin documentary base. The board, whose membership has ranged in numbers from eight to 19, is housed in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building on the White House grounds. Traditionally, it met every other month for two to three days (although the current Obama board meets monthly). Its executive director is appointed by the president, and it has a permanent staff of three to four members, drawn from the intelligence community. Members are unpaid, but they receive travel expenses.
A recurring theme in board recommendations over the years has been management of the CIA’s Operations Directorate, the spy arm of the agency. During the Eisenhower years, for instance, the board reported that it was “unable to conclude” that various covert actions “have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources.” These activities, it felt, “have tended to detract substantially from its primary intelligence gathering mission.”
The same board also complained of Allen W. Dulles’ dual role as director of the·CIA and head of the intelligence community, saying he was “both pitcher and umpire” in competing with other agencies.
The authors write that advisers to President Kennedy took umbrage at the very existence of the board, calling its members “useless impediments, bureaucratic obstructions to a vigorous, activist foreign policy.” The failed Bay of Pigs operation, however, convinced JFK that he needed such a board to provide oversight.
The board seemed to be politically protective of Kennedy in a report on the Cuban missile crisis. It faulted the CIA for not detecting Soviet missiles earlier but did not mention that Secretary of State Dean Rusk and White House National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy had grounded U-2 reconnaissance flights for weeks during September and early October 1962.
Another action that contained more than a hint of politics came during the Ford administration, stemming from an in-house dispute at the CIA over Soviet missile strength. A majority of analysts thought White House fears of increasing Soviet strength were overblown. Dissidents, supported by outside conservative allies, persuaded the PFIAB to task rival “teams” from each faction with examining the hard evidence. The report of the “Team B” hard-liners, which highlighted an increasing Soviet aggressiveness, was used to bolster support for defense spending increases during the Reagan years. (A detailed—and declassified—account of the Team A-Team B turmoil can be found in Studies in Intelligence, the CIA’s in-house journal, available online.)
In the board’s early years, the White House fended off attempts by politicians to use board membership as a plum for friends. Whatever stature the PFIAB achieved under Eisenhower has dwindled as presidents increasingly have used appointments to award friends. For instance, in 1968, New Mexico Democratic Sen. Clinton P. Anderson recommended the appointment of Clinton Murchison Jr., a Texas oil baron and founder of the Dallas Cowboys football team. White House appointments director John W. Macy shot down the recommendation: “He is absolutely unqualified. This is not a board to play around with.” President Reagan appointed a number of California cronies with no intelligence background—most notably, the department-store magnate Alfred S. Bloomingdale.
The political doors swung wide open under President George W. Bush, who, the authors write, “filled his board with those to whom he owed political favors, and large campaign donors.” In selecting PFIAB members in 2005, “he appointed nine campaign donors to fill his 16-member board.”
Even more notorious was an attempt by the Obama administration, acting through Bill Clinton, to persuade Pennsylvania Democratic Rep. Joe Sestak to accept PFIAB board membership to encourage him not to challenge Pennsylvania Sen. Arlen Specter in the Democratic primary in 2009. White House denials struck many observers as lame.
As the authors conclude, “One of the board’s strengths—but also a potential weakness—is that it is subject to the whims of presidents. Previous presidents have used the board well, ignored it, politicized it, even disliked it.” Still, the “fresh perspective” brought to intelligence issues by outside experts is valuable, they contend.
Perhaps. In the post-Sept. 11, period, however, the intelligence community has been besieged by such a plethora of ad hoc experts that its usefulness has been impaired. It’s time to let the professionals do their work in private.
 Cynthia M. Nolan , “PIAB: Advising Presidents,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (27, 3, Fall 2014, pp. 623-632). Dr. Cynthia M Nolan teaches at American Military University and served in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations. She earned her Ph.D. at American University’s School of International Service, Washington, D. C, with a dissertation “Keeping Spies on Course: Searching for Patterns in the Oversight of U.S. Intelligence.”
 I. M. Destler, “National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years,” World Politics, (29, 2, 1977, pp. 144-145.)
 Anne Hessing Cahn (1998). Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 100.
 As quoted in Privileged and Confidential, p. 228.
 Driven by evidence from the PIAB’s earliest years the personal style of the President might be considered the deciding factor in Board’s success. But, using the approach of Alexander George’s famous style typologies, even though both Eisenhower and Kennedy used the Board well, their personal decisionmaking styles were so different as to make this explanation unworkable. See Alexander L. George (1980). Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
 Goulden, Joseph C. in The Intelligencer: Journal of U. S. Intelligence Studies (19, 1, Winter/Spring, 2013, pp. 90-91) Joseph C. Goulden is a long-time reviewer of espionage and spy books for The Washington Times and other publications. Most of the reviews [from The Intelligencer, reproduced in this blog] appeared in prior editions of The Washington Times. Joe Goulden’s recent book is Goulden, Joseph C. (2012). The Dictionary of Espionage: Spyspeak into English. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications