Title: The Role of Military Intelligence, 1965-1967
Author: Joseph A. McChristian
McChristian, Joseph A. (1974). The Role of Military Intelligence, 1965-1967. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
Date Updated: February 12, 2016
Reviewed by George C. Constantinides
General McChristian was J-2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACY), for the period he examines. The monograph is principally concerned with and of greatest value on the organization of military intelligence. We are provided with details and charts of the organization and functions of various components. At the same time, the author’s philosophy on unity of intelligence command, cooperation with the Vietnamese allies, and the size of the required intelligence effort inevitably come through. The official sponsorship and unclassified status of the study limited the author in ways that are obvious to those familiar with the subject. The DIS Bibliography of Intelligence Literature [see below] believed that since the work was unclassified, much of what the author might have wished to say had had to be omitted. Blackstock and Schaf in their bibliography regarded McChristian’s book as a valuable and useful account of the buildup period of combat intelligence in Vietnam pending an official history of the Vietnam War. One finds omissions of various types and of varying degrees of importance. Discussion of classified units and classified efforts are omitted to keep the monograph unclassified; working relations with CIA in Vietnam are barely touched upon; the difficult worlds of counterintelligence and counterespionage require histories in themselves. Additionally, there are some evaluations of the efficacy of the intelligence effort in Vietnam that should be examined more fully with the perspective of time. McChristian later became chief of U.S. Army Intelligence.
This is a review by the Defense Intelligence School.
This brief monograph is one of the Department of the Army series of “Vietnam Studies.” MG McChristian here sets forth his experiences as J-2, MACV, 1965-67. In 1968, he became Chief of Army Intelligence, retiring in 1971. The principle areas he describes are organization, U.S.-South Vietnamese combined military intelligence activities, intelligence operations and production, counterintelligence, and intelligence support activities. The author is writing within the limitations of an unclassified monograph, so that much that he might wish to say, and great detail, have been omitted.
Reviewed by Paul W. Blackstock and Frank L. Schaf
The author was General Westmoreland ‘s chief of lntelligence during the period 1965-67. This is a comprehensive account of the role and development of military intelligence during that period. Described in detail are the concepts and organizations developed for the conduct of combined intelligence activities with the Vietnamese armed forces. Until an official history of the Vietnam War is published by the Army this is a valuable and useful account of the buildup period of U.S. combat intelligence in that area.
 Constantinides, George C. (1983). Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 304
 Blackstock, Paul W.(1978) and Schaf, Frank L. Jr. Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage And Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources. Detroit: Gale Research Co.
 Defense Intelligence School (1981). Bibliography of Intelligence Literature: A Critical And Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature (7th ed, rev.). Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence School, p. 42
 Blackstock, Paul W. (1978) and Frank L. Schaf, Jr. Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, And Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources. Detroit: Gale Research Co., p.