Utilization of Intelligence chapter 5

Title:                      Utilization of Intelligence

Author:                Paul W. Blackstock

Blackstock, Paul W. (1978) and Frank L. Schaf, Jr. “Chapter 5: Utilization of Intelligence,” Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, And Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources. Detroit: Gale Research Co.

LCCN:    74011567

Z6724.I7 B55


Date Updated:  April 18, 2016



Most of the books and articles on the utilization of intelligence are written by active or retired military personnel, and concern the use of intelligence for military purposes ranging from tactical combat to strategic estimates and decision making. A second and much smaller group consists of articles or chapters by scholars concerning the role of intelligence in foreign policy decision making or grand strategy, such as the role of intelligence during World War II. Such articles are listed here rather than under the historical section dealing with espionage in World War Il because of their general interest. The main areas of concern of most of these articles are indicated by their titles so that annotations are for the most part unnecessary. However, certain important articles which have attracted much interest and have had considerable effect are annotated more extensively. A third group consists of certain series of newspaper or other periodical articles which have also been important either as sources of information or as quasi-official “leaks” of either information or comment.

Bryan, George S. (1943). The Spy in America. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott

United States Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (1975). Report of the Commission. Washington , DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [The Murphy Commisson Report.]

Deaver, William C. II. “The History of the Intelligence Division of the British War Office and Its Role in Imperial Affairs 1854-1901.” Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford.

Dulles, Allen W. (2006). The Craft of Intelligence: America’s Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press

Freedman, Larry, “Definition of the Soviet Threat in Strategic Arms Decisions of the United States, 1961-1974.” Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford[1]

Goulden, Joseph C. (1969). Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair: Illusion and Reality. Chicago: Rand McNally

Hilsman, Roger (1956, 1981). Strategic Intelligence And National Decisions. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press

Hilsman, Roger (1967). To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in The Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday

Johnson, Haynes (1964) with Manuel Artime, Jose Perez, San Roman Eineido Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams. The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders’ Story of Brigade 2506. New York: Norton

Kim, Young Hum (1968), compiler. The Central Intelligence Agency: Problems of Secrecy in a Democracy. Lexington, MA: Heath

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. (1969, 1987). Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures In World War II. Boulder, CO: Westview Press

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. (1968). The Real CIA. New York, Macmillan

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. (1973). The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy And Domestic Activities. New York, Hill and Wang

McCoy ,Alfred W. (2003). The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia: CIA Complicity in The Global Drug Trade: Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books

McGarvey, Patrick J. (1972). CIA: The Myth and the Madness. New York: Saturday Review Press

Marchetti, Victor (1990) and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Knopf

Meyer, Karl E. (1962) and Tad Szulc. The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster. New York: Praeger

Strong, Kenneth (1972). Men of Intelligence: A Study of The Roles And Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence From World War I to The Present Day. New York: St. Martin’s Press

Whaley, Barton (1973). Codeword BARBAROSSA. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Wise, David (1964) and Thomas B. Ross. The Invisible Government. New York: Random House

Wohlstetter, Roberta (1962). Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press

Zacharias, Ellis M. (1950) in collaboration with Ladislas Farago. Behind Closed Doors; The Secret History of The Cold War. New York: Putnam


Africa Research Group (c. 1972). Intelligence And Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA

The Africa Research Group describes itself as a “radical research/action collective concerned with exposing and fighting American imperialist penetration of Africa.” The pamphlet reproduces with introductory comment and notes a transcript of a Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Group meeting which took place on 8 January 1968, on the subject of intelligence and foreign policy. (A transcript of this discussion group meeting is also printed in the appendix to The CIA And The Cult of Intelligence[2]. Also included in this pamphlet is a five-page report entitled “CIA Intervention in Africa.”

Baldwin, Hanson W. An important series of five articles in the New York Times.

  • “lntelligence—One of the Weakest Links in Our Security, Survey Shows Omissions, Duplications,” 20 July 1948, p. 6.
  • “Older Agencies Resent a Successor and Try to Restrict Scope of Action.” 22 July 1948, p. 2.
  • “Intelligence III: Errors in Collecting Data Held Exceeded by Evaluation Weakness.” 23 July 1948, p. 5.
  • “Competent Personnel Held Key to Success—Reforms Suggested.” 24 July 1948, p. 5.
  • “Broader Control Set-Up is Held Need with a ‘Watch-Dog’ Committee for Congress.” 25 July 1948, p. 15.

Baldwin, Hanson W. “The Growing Risks of Bureaucratic Intelligence.” Reporter (29, August 1963) pp. 48-50, 53.

Barnds, William J. “Intelligence and Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a Democracy.” Foreign Affairs (47, January 1969), pp. 281-95.

A general discussion of the CIA and foreign policy by a former CIA analyst.

Barnet, Richard J. “The CIA’s New Cover.” New York Review of Books, (30 December 1971), pp. 6-8.

Under the guise of a book review (of Victor Marchetti’s The Rope Dancer[3]) the author, a former State Department official, writes a highly critical essay on the ClA and its clandestine activities, including covert operations. He argues that contrary to news leaks indicating that the CIA’s clandestine services are being downgraded, they are merely seeking to “professionalize” by taking deeper cover.

Belair, Felix, Jr. “C.l.A. Identifies 21 Asian Opium Refineries.” New York Times, 6 June 1971, p. 2.

The author quotes extensively from an official ClA analysis of opium refining in the Burma-Laos-Thailand border area known as the “Golden Triangle.” The article also quotes Congressman Robert H. Steele (R-Conn ), a former CIA agent and author of a report on the drug traffic in Southeast Asia.

Blechman, Morris J. “The Stupidity of Intelligence.” In Readings In American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective[4], pp. 328-34. (Reprinted from Peters, Charles, ed. Inside The System: A Washington Monthly Reader. New York: Praeger, 1970).

Blachman, a political scientist and former Air Force officer attached to tactical reconnaissance in Vietnam, describes “the way the military, and especially the Air Force, gathered and reported the results of its bombing of the North. Those reports greatly exaggerated the effects of the bombing, misleading the American public and, to the extent that they took the reports at face value, misleading both military and civilian policymakers.” He concludes that “wrong decisions are continuing hazards as long. as the Pentagon’s civilian leadership, the Congress, and the public rely on the military’s self-serving intelligence system.”

Blackstock, Paul W. “CIA: A Non-inside Report.” Worldview (9, May 1966), pp. 10-13.

A brief review of the role of the CIA, its status, image, and the problems of surveillance.

Blackstock, Paul W. (1974). CIA And The Intelligence Community: Their Roles, Organization And Functions. St. Louis, MO: Forum Press [OCLC: 4226999]

A primer or “learning module” for the layman and students. Among the topics discussed are intelligence and covert operations, the U .S. intelligence community under the Nixon reorganization, the CIA and Watergate, and the problems of congressional surveillance and control of both intelligence and covert operations.

Blackstock, Paul W. “The CIA Looks Good in the Pentagon Papers.” PERSPECTIVE (the Sunday magazine section of the Baltimore Sun), (18 July 1971), p. K1

An article on the improved image of the CIA as a result of its National Intelligence Estimates prepared during the war in Vietnam, as revealed in the Pentagon Papers[5].

Blackstock, Paul W. “Intelligence and Covert Operations: Changing Doctrine and Practice.” University of South Carolina, Department of Government and International Studies, (December 1973). 125 p. Mimeographed.

Blackstock, Paul W. “A Look at the Intelligence Establishment.” Worldview (14, September 1971), pp. 17-19.

A review of Harry Howe Ransom’s The Intelligence Establishment[6]

Blackstock, Paul W. [book review]. Worldview (17, April 1974),pp. 54-56.

A review of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick’s The U.S. Intelligence Community[7] and Patrick J. McGarvey’s CIA: The Myth And The Madness[8]. Blackstock takes the view that “for an analysis in depth of the many disturbing questions which Kirkpatrick leaves unanswered one must turn to less popular but more rewarding studies such as Harry Howe Ranson ‘s classic, The Intelligence Establishment[9]

Branch, Taylor. “The Censors of Bumbledom.” Harper’s Magazine, (January 1974), pp. 56-63.

A highly critical article by a contributing editor of Harper’s on CIA efforts to censor and, if possible, to enjoin publication by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks of The CIA And The Cult of Intelligence[10]. The author argues that “if the government wins its case, Marchetti and Marks will have unwittingly helped create the legal tools to make a vassal of every government employee who enters the sacred chambers of national security.” (Marchetti is a former CIA aide who served for some time at the directorate level.)

Bruce, David K. E. “The National Intelligence Authority.” Virginia Quarterly Review (22, Summer 1946), pp. 355-69.

A thoughtful review of the deficiencies of American intelligence in the pre-World War II period and a plea for the establishment of an independent national intelligence authority. The author was the commander of OSS in the European theater during the war and has since served as U.S. Ambassador to England, France, and Germany and headed the U.S. mission to the People’s Republic of China.

Campbell, John Franklin. “The Intelligence and Propaganda Complexes.” In his The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory[11], pp. 147-77.

Campbell writes that “major concern has been expressed outside the system over the years that the intelligence system has not been under adequate policy controls.” He argues that in both espionage and covert operations the CIA and related agencies have operated as Iaws unto themseIves.

“Camp Peary Exposed as CIA Training Base.” Virginia Gazette, (22, December 1972), pp. 1, 13.

A detailed report, including several revealing photographs of the 10,000-acre training camp called “the farm.” The report is based on the result of four weeks of investigation by staffer Ed Offley and news editor W. C. O’Donovan.

“Camp Peary Linked to ‘Assassination Teams’.” Virginia Gazette, (9 February 1973), p. 1.

An article based on interviews on the subject with Victor Marchetti and Patrick McGarvey.

Cline, Ray S. “Policy without Intelligence.” Foreign Policy (17,Winter1974-75), pp. 121-35.)

The author, a former deputy director (intelligence) of the CIA and head of lNR, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has written a trenchant critique of the personalized, idiosyncratic Nixon-Kissinger style of foreign policy decision making. Their foreign policy style emphasized secrecy to such an extent that the National Security Council (NSC) and related supportive intelligence bureaus were in effect bypassed or ignored . This important, authoritative article, which includes as contrasting case studies the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the U.S. military alert of October 24, 1973, not only criticizes the neglect of intelligence by the Nixon administration, but also recommends changes in procedure designed to restore the NSC and the intelligence estimative function to the effectively supportive roles for which they were designed. The author expresses the hope that “the President and Secretary of State can build confidence and common understanding within and with the foreign policy and intelligence bureaucracy which they control, mainly by using it and engaging its skills in decision-making.” An important article by an extremely knowledgeable source dealing with basic principles as well as operations.

Cooper, Chester L. “The CIA and Decision-Making.” Foreign Affairs (50, January 1972), pp. 223-36.

An excellent account of the activities of the Office of National Estimates (comprised of the Board of National Estimates and the National Estimates Staff) which works for the director of Central Intelligence. In the article, experienced intelligence analyst Cooper describes the content of some of the National Estimates produced, especially those produced during the Vietnam War. The author calls for changes, and after the article appeared, the Office of National Estimates was disestablished and a group of National Intelligence Officers was formed to replace the old office and board.

Costa, John, and Evans, Gary Lee. Legislation Introduced Relative to The Activities of The Intelligence Agencies, 1947-1972. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, UB 250 U.S.A. 73-22 F, 1973. 63 p. Appendices.

This pamphlet provides a comprehensive list of bills proposed in the Congress between the years 1947 and 1972 relating to U.S. intelligence agencies. A brief legislative history of each bill is provided along with its text. Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA and the National Security Council, and the passage of the 1949 Security Act modification relating to the organization and functions of the CIA, nearly 200 bills have been introduced in Congress which are relative to intelligence organizations. The pamphlet further reveals that the majority of these bills represented attempts to establish a Congressional committee to oversee the activities of the CIA of which only two reached the floor of Congress. Both surviving bills were defeated by more than two-thirds majority.

Donovan, William J. “Intelligence, Key to Defense.” LIFE, (30 September 1946), pp. 108-20.

A sympathetic critique of prewar intelligence and of wartime OSS by its founder and director. Includes suggestions for postwar organization.

Dulles, Allen W. “Intelligence Estimating and National Security.” Department of State Bulletin 42 (March 1960, pp. 411-16).

Evans, Allan. “Intelligence and Policy Formation.” World Politics, (October 1959, pp. 84-91).

A former official in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) discusses the intelligence problem as seen from the directorate level in INR.

Evans, Allan, and Gatewood, R .D. “Intelligence and Research: Sentinel and Scholar in Foreign Relations.” Department of State Bulletin 42 (June 1960, pp. 1023-27).

Finney, JohnW. “War Signals Misjudged, U.S. Official Concedes.” New York Times, (31 October 1973, pp. 1, 16).

An analysis of the failure of both U.S. and Israeli intelligence to predict the outbreak of the fourth Middle East war on October 6, 1973. The author writes: “In remarks that seemed critical of the intelligence community’s performance, Secretary of State Kissinger said in a news conference October 12 that three times in the week immediately preceding the outbreak of war United States and Israeli intelligence agencies had been asked for assessments. They had come back with the conclusion, he said, that ‘hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it.’ To Mr. Kissinger, this illustrated ‘the gravest danger of intelligence assessments’—trying—‘to fit the facts into existing preconceptions and to make them consistent with what is anticipated.’ This is a judgment now widely shared in the intelligence community.”

Graham, Daniel 0. “Estimating the Threat: A Soldier’s Job.” Army (23, April 1973), pp. 14-18.

Lieutenant General Graham, formerly deputy director of estimates in the Defense Intelligence Agency, later deputy director of the CIA for the intelligence community (D/DCI [IC]) and then head of DIA, argues in this candid, revealing article that the function of estimating military threats to U.S. security properly belongs to DIA. “The lack of confidence in the threat estimates emanating from military intelligence agencies … stemmed from a series of bad overestimates, later dubbed ‘bomber gap,’ ‘missile gap,’ and ‘megaton gap.’” However, he argues, with the reorganization of DIA in November 1970, a new directorate of estimates has corrected past errors As a results “The time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer have come a long way since the ‘missile gap’ days. DIA has hit its stride in the production of respectable military estimates. . . . There is no longer a need, in my judgment, to duplicate DIA’s efforts in other agencies.”

Groth, Alexander. “On the Intelligence Aspects of Personal Diplomacy.” Orbis (7, Winter 1964), pp. 838-48.

Hamilton, Andrew. “The CIA’s Dirty Tricks under Fire at Last,” Progressive, (September 1973), pp. 14-22.

ln 1973 the author served in the office of program analysis of the National Security Council. Although the main focus of the article is on the CIA’s clandestine services, it is an excellent general review of the agency’s recent history and reorganization under the Nixon administration. The author argues that “the Administration’s approach . . . will be to cope with the CIA’s current crisis merely by making its covert operations even more truly clandestine, and by restricting them in size to reduce the risk of exposure.”

Harkness, Richard, and Gladys Harkness, “The Mysterious Doings of CIA,” Saturday Evening Post, (30 October 1954), pp. 19-21, 162, 165; (6 November 1954), pp. 34-35, 64, 66, 68; and (13 November 1954), pp. 30, 132-34.

These three articles are the locus classicus of unofficial CIA boosts that the agency was involved in the overthrow of King Farouk in July 1952; of the Iranian Premier, Dr. Mossadegh, in August 1953; and of the Communist-controlled Arbenz regime in Guatemala in May 1954. The cold war tone of the articles is indicated by the conclusion to the account of the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh: “It is the guiding premise of ClA’s third force that we must develop and nurture indigenous freedom legions among captive or threatened people who stand ready to take personal risks for their own liberty.”

Helms, Richard M. “Spying and a Free Society,” excerpts from an address, 14 April 1971, as reprinted in U.S. News & World Report, (26 April 1971), pp. 84-86.

Hersh, Seymour M. “CIA Head Names Espionage Chief: Colby Becomes Director of Clandestine Operations.” New York Times, (1 March 1973), p. 19.

An informative article which provides details of several important changes at the directorate level in the CIA.

Hilsmen, Roger. “lntelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Policy.” In Scott, Andrew MacKay (1965) and Raymond H. Dawson, eds. Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan. [LCCN: 65013587], pp. 447-56.

Hilsmen, Roger. “The Intelligence Process.” In Scott, Andrew MacKay (1965) and Raymond H. Dawson, eds. Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy. New York, Macmillan. [LCCN: 65013587], pp. 456-66.

Hilsmen, Roger. “lntelligence through the Eyes of tne Policy Maker.” In Blum, Richard H. (1972), ed. Foreword by Adlai E. Stevenson III. Surveillance And Espionage in A Free Society; a report by the planning group on intelligence and security to the Policy Council of the Democratic National Committee. New York: Praeger Publishers.

A report by the planning group on intelligence and security to the Policy Council of the Democratic National Committee in which the one-time head of State Department intelligence provides his interesting views.

Hobbing, Enno. “CIA: Hottest Role in the Cold War.” Esquire, (September 1957), pp. 31-34.

A journalistic account of CIA covert operations with some interesting details on recruitment and use of defectors from behind the iron curtain.

Jervis, Robert. “Hypotheses on Misperception.” WORLD POLITICS (20 April 1968), pp. 454-79.

Karnow, Stanley. “Access by Hill to CIA Data Recommended.” Washington Post, (29 March 1972), p. 4.

An article based on testimony given at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during which two former senior employees of the CIA urged that selected congressional committees be provided regularly with intelligence studies on U.S. foreign relations and “matters of national security.” Chester L. Cooper, formerly with the Office of National Estimates, “suggested that Congress be authorized to receive the National Security Study Memoranda” produced by the NSC. Herbert Scoville, Jr., formerly CJA’s director of science and technology, “asserted that the administration has deliberately misused intelligence in its presentations to Congress to promote its own legislation,” citing the 1969 Safeguard antiballistic missile program of the Nixon administration.

Kendall, Willmoore. “The Function of Intelligence.” World Politics, (July 1949), pp. 542-52.

A critical analysis of Shermer Kent’s book, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy[12]. The late Professor Kendall challenges prevailing doctrine on the function, organization, and role of intelligence.

Kent, Sherman. “Estimates and Influence: Some Reflections on What Should Make Intelligence Persuasive in Policy Deliberations.” Foreign Service Journal, (April 1969), pp. 16-18, 45.

Taking the point of view of the intelligence producer, Kent writes that “in many cases, no matter what we tell the policy-maker, and no matter how right we are, and how convincing, he will upon occasion disregard the thrust of our findings for reasons beyond our ken. If influence cannot be our goal, what should it be? Two things. It should be to be relevant within the area of our competence, and above all it should be to be credible. . . . To wish simply for influence can, and upon occasion does, get intelligence to the place where it can have no influence whatever. By striving too hard in this direction intelligence may come to seem just another policy voice, and an unwanted one at that. On the other hand, . . . unself-conscious intelligence work, even in the speculative and highly competitive ore a of estimates, may prove (in fact, has proved many times) a key determinant in policy decision.”

Kissinger, Henry J., and the National Securlry Council Staff. “National Security Study Memorandum-1 (NSSM-1)” in the Congressional Record. 118, part 3. 92d Cong., 2d sess., (May 10, 1972), pp. 16748-836; (May 11, 1972), pp. 17186-89.

Prepared in early July 1969, this was the first such NSC “Study Memorandum” produced by the agency, based on studies prepared in the Departments of State, Defense, and the CIA. NSSM-1 reviews widely differing intelligence estimates of the political and military situation in Vietnam, and concludes, in part: “It is noteworthy that the gap in views that does exist is largely one between policy makers, the analysts, and the intelligence community on one hand, and the civilian and military operators on the other.”

Knorr, Klaus. “Failure in National Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles.” World Politics, (April 1964), pp. 455-67.

The author defends the intelligence system’s failure to give earlier warning of the emplacement of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962.

Langer, William L. “Scholarship and the Intelligence Problem.” Proceedings Of The American Philosophical Society (92, March 1948), pp. 43-45.

A brief summary of the role of the Research and Analysis branch of OSS during World War II, and a plea for the necessity of its continuing function in the postwar period. Langer is an eminent American historian who served in that organization.

Lasswell, Harold D. “Policy and the Intelligence Function: Ideological Intelligence.” In his

Lasswell, Harold D. (1948). The Analysis of Political Behavior; An Empirical Approach. London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner [LCCN: 48019807], pp. 55-68.

Leacacos, John P. “Intelligence: The Raw Material of Diplomatists.” In Leacacos, John P. (1968). Fires in The In-Basket; The ABC’s of The State Department. Cleveland, World Pub. Co. [LCCN: 68019330], pp. 468-537.

Excellent functional analysis which is neither a hatchet job nor a snow job. A comprehensive review of the operations of the Bureau of Intelligence with many details on recent crises is found on pages 481-500.

McGarvey,. Patrick J. “DIA: Intelligence to Please.” In Halperin, Morton H. (1973) and Arnold Kanter, eds. Readings in American Foreign Policy; A Bureaucratic Perspective [13]. Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 318-28.

The author demonstrates that “the output from DIA is more inclined to serve the interests of the military services than the needs of good decision-making by their civilian superiors. . . . At the least, recognizing that the information supplied is unreliable, the Secretary [of Defense] may rely on alternate sources (where available) or proceed on the basis of deficient data. At the worst, the Secretary will fail to recognize the particular distortions in the intelligence reports he receives. To this extent, he will make decisions based on information designed less to reflect reality than to enhance careers and protect organizations.” (From the abstract by Halperin).

Marchetti, Victor. “CIA: The President’s Loyal Tool.” Nation, (3 April 1972), pp. 430-33.

The author, who was on the CIA director’s staff until his resignation in 1970, writes: “The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations. In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs …. Only when one understands that, despite claims to the contrary, the CIA is basically concerned with interfering in the affairs of foreign countries, and that the agency carries out this mission with the approval and at the request of the country’s political leaders, can one begin to deal with the issue. It is not a matter of reforming the CIA. The need is to reform those who govern us, to convince them that they must act more openly and honestly, both with the people whom they represent and with the other nations of the world.”

Neumann, Robert G. “Political Intelligence and Its Relation to Military Government.” In Friedrich, Carl J. (1948). American Experiences in Military Government in World War II. New York, Rinhart. [LCCN: 48002285], pp. 70-85

An excellent article by a political scientist (formerly in political intelligence work attached to G-2, First and Third U.S. Armies) discussing the need for political intelligence as an integral part of military intelligence, and its role in military government.

Newsweek, editors of. “The CIA—An Attack and a Reply: A Former Staff Officer Criticizes CIA Activities; A Former CIA Executive Defends Its Operations.” Newsweek, (11 October 1971), pp. 78-84.

An important and revealing controversy between Victor Marchetti, the former staff officer, and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., the former CIA executive. A classic exposition of two sharply contrasting views of the agency, and especially the role of its clandestine services.

Newsweek, editors of. “The New Espionage American Style.” Newsweek, (22 November, 1971), pp. 28-40.

A quasi-official survey of the U.S. intelligence community and its reorganization under the Nixon administration. With respect to the CIA’s clandestine services, this report concludes: “The gaudy era of the adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C . Helms and his gray specialists has settled in.”

Oberdorfer, Don. “Helms to Oversee U.S. Spy Network.” Washington Post, (6 November 1971), pp. 1, 15.

A detailed article on changes in the U.S. intelligence community following the announcement on November 5, 1971, by President Nixon, of “a long-awaited reorganization … creating a government-wide coordinating role for CIA Director Richard Helms and bringing military agencies under closer civilian control …. “ The aim of the reorganization, according to the White House announcement, was to improve “efficiency and effectiveness.” Although the statement did not say so, high-ranking officials were known to feel that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it produced.

“The Pike Papers: House Select Committee on Intelligence CIA Report.” Special Supplement to Village Voice, (October 1976), pp. 18-24.

The New York weekly tabloid Village Voice reprinted portions of the secret House of Representative’s Select Committee on Intelligence report of its investigations of the U.S. intelligence community. The portion referenced here records the committee’s findings on the performance of the intelligence community during several world crises. The Vietnam Tet Offensive by North Vietnam and Vietcong forces, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets, the Mid-East wars, the crisis in Portugal, and the Cyprus crisis are among the incidents in which the performance of the community is assessed.

Ransom, Harry Howe. “How Effective Is Central Intelligence?” Christlan Science Monitor, (1 December 1958), p . 13.

A general discussion of the intelligence function, and description of its evolution in the United States after World War II.

Ransom, Harry Howe. “How Intelligent is Intelligence?” New York Times Magazine, (22 May 1960), pp. 26, 80-83.

A discussion of the problem of managing espionage activities in a democratic society, written shortly after the downing of an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over the Soviet Union in early May 1960.

Ransom, Harry Howe. “Secret Mission in an Open Society.” New York Times Magazine, (21 May 1961), pp. 20, 77-79.

An analysis of the problem of responsible political control of secret operations, written in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Robinson, Donald. “They Fight the Cold War under Cover.” Saturday Evening Post, (20 November 1948), p. 30.

Written in 1948, within the first year of the CIA’s existence and apparently with the agency’s help, this article reveals the extensive overseas political operations of CIA agents.

Rosenthal, Jack, “A.E.C. Chief to Replace Helms as C.l.A. Director: Schlesinger, 43, Chosen—Intelligence Official to be Envoy to Iran.” New York Times, (22 December 1972), pp. 1, 8.

Based on President Nixon’s announcement of 21 December 1972 . In the opinion of knowledgeable officials, it would mean the end of an era of professional intelligence operatives and the beginning of an era of systems management .

Sapin, Burton M. “Intelligence, Planning, and Policy Analysis.” In Smith, Mark E., III (1968) and Claude J. Johns, Jr., eds. American Defense Policy. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. [LCCN: 68009675], pp. 416-32.

Steinhauser, Thomas C. “A Winning Team: Hew the NMCC Works.” Armed Forces Journal, (May 1972), pp. 48-49.

A brief article on the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the U.S. Department of Defense, and its close working relationship with the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency).

Stern, Laurence. “$1.5 Billion Secret in Sky: U.S. Spy Unit Surfaces by Ace ident. “ Washington Post, (9 December 1973), p. A 1.

An article on the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) operated out of the office of the secretary of the air force, which supervises the U.S. overhead surveillance program employing the U-2 and SR-71 planes and a variety of reconnaissance satellites.

Szulc, Tad. “The View from Langley.” Outlook (the Sunday magazine of the Washington Post), (21 October 1973), pp. C1, C5.

An article on CIA intervention in Chilean affairs under Allende, based on the secret testimony of CIA Director William E. Colby before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. The transcript of this testimony “was made available … by sources in the intelligence community.”

“U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community Reorganized by President Nixon.” Department of State Bulletin 65 (November 1971), pp. 658-59.

Unna, Warren. “CIA: Who Watches the Watchman?” Harper’s Magazine, (April 1958), pp. 46-53.

An informative journalistic account of the CIA’s role in the Washington decision-making process in the 1950s, with emphasis on the question of congressional surveillance.

Welles, Benjamin. “First Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on CIA.” New York Times, (13 February 1972), p , 3.

An important article on congressional surveillance of the CIA. The reporter notes: “The foreign aid authorization bill, signed by President Nixon on Monday, includes for the first time in a quarter-century new controls on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency …. The controls were inserted at various points in this year’s aid bill largely through the efforts of Senators Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey; Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri. They are members of the Foreign Relations Committee [who] have protested increasingly in recent months that Congress has too little knowledge of, let alone control over, the agency’s activities, particularly in Southeast Asia.”

Welles, Benjamin. “H-L-S [Helms] of the C. I.A.” New York Times Magazine, (18 April 1971), pp. 34-35, 37, 39, 41-42, 43, 46, 48, 52, 54.

An informative article on the director of the CIA, analyzing his role and influence in national security affairs. Contains a discussion of covert operations, including the agency’s acquisition of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” denouncing Stalin’s errors.

Welles, Benjamin. “Secrecy Redefined, ‘New’ CIA—with Colby’s Brand on It.” Christian Sclence Monitor, (5 March 1974), p. 2.

A review of the CIA under the direction of William Colby, with emphasis on the abolishing of the Board of National Estimates and its replacement by a staff of national intelligence officers. According to Welles, Colby has indicated that CIA Involvement in analysis of world events or in science, research, and technology need no Ionger be kept secret,

Welles, Benjamin. “U.S. Intelligence Arm—Weakened? Mideast War Reveals Flaws.” Christian Science Monitor, (29 October 1973), pp. 1, 5.

A well-informed article, based on interviews with intelligence experts, reviewing the “intelligence gap” in the Mideast Arab-Israeli war. The line taken is that “Nixon-administration budget cuts in the United States intelligence community over the past three years have seriously weakened the nation’s intelligence arm . . . . Spy satellite and electronic intelligence both have been heavily cut back. Moreover, Mr. Nixon’s rapid-fire personnel shifts with three directors of Central Intelligence—Richard M. Helms, James R. Schlesinger, and William Colby—in six months have impaired the nation’s intelligence arm. The CIA’s tangential involvement in the Watergate scandal, moreover, has improved neither its morale nor its image.”

Wicker, Tom, et al. An important five-part series authored by Tom Wicker and other members of the Washington, D .C. staff of the New York Times reveals and discusses specific operations of the CIA as well as its policy, organization, and controls.

”CIA: Maker of Policy, or Tool?.” New York Times, (25 April 1966), pp. 1, 20. “How CIA Put ‘Instant Air Force’ into Congo.” New York Times, (26 April 1966), pp. 1, 3.

“CIA Spies from 100 Miles Up; Satellite Probes Secrets of Soviet.” New York Times, (27 April 1966), pp. 1, 28.

“CIA Operations: A Plot Scuttled.” New York Times, (28 April 1966), pp. 1, 28.

“The CIA: Qualities of Director.” New York Times, (29 April 1966), pp. 1, 18.

Wise, David . “Colby of C. I. A. —C. I .A. of Colby.” New York Tlmes Magazine, (1 July 1973), p. 15.

A detailed study of the clandestine operations career of the designated successor to William Colby as director of Central Intelligence, by one of the coauthors of The Invisible Government (see Wise, David (1964) and Thomas B. Ross. The Invisible Government[14].) In addition to cataloging some twelve separate covert operations of the CIA, the author discusses personality and organizational changes in the clandestine services of the agency.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. “Cuba and Pearl Harbor.” Foreign Affairs (43, July 1965), pp. 691-707.

A comparison of the strategic surprises in the Pearl Harbor attack and in the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba two decades later.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. “Intelligence and Decision-Making.” In Scott, Andrew MacKay (1965) and Raymond H. Dawson, eds. Readings in The Making of American Foreign Policy. New York, Macmillan. [LCCN: 65013587], pp. 431-47.


Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. [Hoover Commission, 1949] “Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs.” Appendix H, p. 95. Washington, D .C., Government Printing Office, January 1949; “Foreign Affairs, A Report to the Congress,” pp. 15, 16, 56, 57. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1949; “Task Force Report, National Security Organization.” Appendix G, pp. 4, 32, 76-78. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1949.

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. [Hoover Commission, 1955] “Intelligence Activities: A Report to the Congress.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1955. ix, 76 p. Also published as House Doc. no. 201, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955.

An unclassified report of the intelligence task force of the second Hoover Commission. The task force was chaired by General Mark W. Clark. It investigated the functions of the intelligence community, including the CIA. The task force discovered an undue emphasis on covert action over intelligence collection and analysis in the CIA, and criticized the quantity and quality of its intelligence coverage of the USSR. A congressional oversight committee was recommended, only to be turned down by the overall commission, Improved management of intelligence in the CIA was also recommended. Another committee, under the chairmanship of General James Doolittle, was organized to investigate CIA’s clandestine services. The report was classified.

Dulles, Allen W. “Memorandum Respecting . . . Central Intelligence Agency . . . . Submitted to Senate Committee on Armed Services, 25 April 1947. In National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services) : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eightieth Congress, first session on S. 758, a bill to promote the National Security by providing for a National Defense Establishment which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the National Security. March 18, 20, 25, 26, April 1, 2, and 3, 1947. [LCCN: 47032249]

A concise statement of Dulles’ views as of 1947 on a central intelligence organization. The Dulles memorandum Is also printed in appendix A of Ransom, Harry Howe (1958). Central Intelligence And National Security.[15].

U.S. Bureau of the Budget. “Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government.” A Report to the President. Washington, DC: 20 September 1945. Mimeographed.

U.S. Congress. Act to Provide for the Administration of the CIA. . . And for Other Purposes. Public Law 110, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 20 June 1949, 63 Stat. 208.

This act was designed to strengthen the administration of the CIA. lt gave additional powers to the director, both in protecting the secrecy of CIA operations and in the unvouchered expenditure of money.

U.S. Congress. National Security Act of 1947. Public Law 253, SOth Cong., 26 July 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 USC Supp. 403. .

Section 102 contains provisions establishing the CIA. This is the CIA’s basic charter.

U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States (1946). Investigation of The Pearl Harbor Attack Report: A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing An Investigation Of The Attack On Pearl harbor On December 7, 1941, And Events And Circumstances Relating Thereto[16].

The official record of the testimony, evidence, and findings of the 1945-46 Pearl Harbor inquiry. Contains much material on intercepts and intelligence organizations.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Amending The Central Intelligence Act Of 1949: Report To Accompany H.R. 16306. 89th Cong., 2d sess., 11 August 1966.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Inquiry Into The U.S.S, Pueblo And Ec-121 Plane Incidents.- 91st Cong., 1st sess., 28 July 1969. Rept. no, .91-12.

U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Agencies And Activities: The Performance of The Intelligence Community: Hearings. Part 2. 94th Cong., 1st sess., 11, 12, 18, 25, 30 September and 7, 30, 31 October 1974. 937 p. (See United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Intelligence (1977). CIA: The Pike Report.[17]

Part of the hearings of the House of Representatives special committee investigating the intelligence community, chaired by Congressman Otis G. Pike. Recorded in this report is the expert testimony of witnesses regarding the intelligence available, and its use in the decision process of the nation regarding the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Tet offensive of the Vietnam War, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the coup d’etat in Portugal in April 1974.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services. National Defense Establishment: Hearings On S. 758. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. 3 parts.

Part 3 contains testimony on central intelligence.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. Intelligence And National Security: Report, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Naval Affairs. “Report to the Secretary of the Navy. Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security,” [Eberstadt Report] 79th Cong., 1st sess., 22 October 1945.

In June 1945 Secretary of Navy James V. Forrestal commissioned his friend and investment banker, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to study a merger of the navy and war departments, a structure for centralized decision making, a separate air force, and a National Security Council. Eberstadt also believed that a central intelligence role for analysis and for coordination of departmental intelligence was also needed. A section of the Eberstadt report was drafted by Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, deputy chief of naval intelligence, who, in January 1946 became the first director of Central Intelligence. Souers’s recommendations included a coordination role for central intelligence, not the erection of an independent central intelligence agency. See especially pages 12-13 and 159-63 of the report, Eberstadt also chaired a task force of the first Hoover Commission of 1949 (see Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. [Hoover Commission, 1955] “Intelligence Activities: A Report to the Congress.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1955. ix, 76 p. Also published as House Doc. no. 201, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955.).

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Report, Joint Committee On Central Intelligence Agency. 84th Cong., 2d sess., 23 February 1956. S. Rept. no. 1570.

The committee supported, by on eight-to-one vote, the proposal to establish a joint congressional committee on the CIA. Contains the outlines of the argument in favor of such a move as well as the dissenting argument.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Communist Forgeries. Hearings. 87th Cong., lst sess., 2 June 1961.

Testimony of Richard Helms, assistant director, CIA, concerning the preparation by Soviet and other Communist intelligence agencies of fabricated and forged news articles, documents, and intelligence reports (see Chapter 21, “disinformation, Deception, Frauds, And Forgeries,” Section C, “Frauds and Forgeries.”).

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, “Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments.” Hearings, 83 Cong., 1st sess,, 25 June 1953.

Contains testimony relative to the organization within the Department of State for the conduct of intelligence during the period 1945-47. Also included are reprints of important documents and correspondence of the period. See especially pages 854-82 of the report.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, “The Wennerstroem Spy Case, How it Touched the U.S. and NATO.” 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964.

Reveals details of the disclosures to the Soviets of information on U. S, weapons and plans and the possible effects on U.S. Western defense posture, by Swedish Air Force Colonel, and Soviet spy, Stig Wennerstroem.

U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government. Allocation of Resources In The Soviet Union And China—1975: HEARINGS. Part 1. 94th Cong. 1st sess. Executive Sessions, 18 June and 21 July 1975. Appendix, charts, graphs, tables.

A remarkable report in that it contains the testimony of the director of the CIA regarding the status of the Soviet and Chinese economies and the capabilities of the two countries in military weapons production, plus the testimony of the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) regarding the expenditures of both countries for military weapons production. The report is essentially a first in the publication in unclassified form of estimates of Soviet and Chinese economic potential and the percentages of gross national product devoted to military production. The methodologies used by both intelligence agencies is discussed frankly. The appendix is a reprint of a study prepared by the director of Net Assessments of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in which the methodologies for economic and military assessments used by the intelligence agencies is discussed, Net assessments, a relatively new technique, is a means by which U.S. and Soviet (or Chinese) economic and military potentials ore compared for planning purposes.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR: Intelligence And Research In The Department Of State. Doc. no. 0-496-792.Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973. 19 p.

Includes organization chart of the bureau. A concise, well-written pamphlet on the role, functions, and organization of INR. The following excerpts summarize its origin, role, and functions:

“The need for specialized research capabilities was the reason for the creation, in 1946, of a centralized unit within the Department of State which could devote itself exclusively to the processing, analysis, and evaluation of data collected from all parts of the world by all the agencies of the U .S, Government, particularly the CIA, the FBI, and the Defense Department intelligence agencies, This center is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). . . .

“INR culls the elaborate information-gathering apparatus of the Government for missing data and collates and disseminates material which can, be of use, indicating its relevance to foreign affairs, Staffed by a close-knit group of experienced officers, the Bureau can focus quickly the full range of information relevant to topical questions of foreign policy. It operates independently of the Department’s geographic and functional policy bureaus, which concentrate on the formulation of policy in their respective areas rather than on a systematic view of what is happening all over the world. . ..


Gravel, Mike (1971-2), Noam Chomsky, and Howard Zinn. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam (The Senator Gravel edition – 5 vols.). Boston, Beacon Press

Sheehan, Neil (1971), Hendrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield. The Pentagon Papers: As Published By The New York Times, Based On Investigative Reporting By Neil Sheehan. New York: Bantam Books

U.S. Department of Defense (1971). United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.


[1] See biographical sketch of Sir Lawrence Freedman. Accessed November 17, 2015

[2] Marchetti, Victor (1990) and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Knopf

[3] Victor Marchetti (1971). The Rope–Dancer. New York: Grosset & Dunlap

[4] Halperin, Morton H. (1973) and] Arnold Kanter, eds. Readings in American Foreign Policy; A Bureaucratic Perspective. Boston: Little, Brown

[5] New York Times (1971). The Pentagon Papers: as published by the New York times, based on investigative reporting by Neil Sheehan, written by Neil Sheehan [and others] Articles and documents edited by Gerald Gold, Allan M. Siegal and Samuel Abt. New York: Bantam Books

[6] Ransom, Harry Howe (1970). The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press

[7] Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. (1973). The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy And Domestic Activities. New York, Hill and Wang

[8] McGarvey, Patrick J. (1972). CIA: The Myth and the Madness. New York: Saturday Review Press

[9] Ransom, Harry Howe (1970). The Intelligence Establishment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press

[10] Marchetti, Victor (1990) and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Knopf

[11] Campbell, John Franklin (1971). The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory. New York, Basic Books. [LCCN: 73158438]

[12] Kent, Sherman (1966). Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Hamden, CT: Archon Books

[13] Halperin, Morton H. (1973) and] Arnold Kanter, eds. Readings in American Foreign Policy; A Bureaucratic Perspective. Boston: Little, Brown

[14] Wise, David (1964) and Thomas B. Ross. The Invisible Government. New York: Random House

[15] Ransom, Harry Howe (1958). Central Intelligence And National Security. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 217-24

[16] Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States (1946). Investigation of The Pearl Harbor Attack Report: A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing An Investigation Of The Attack On Pearl harbor On December 7, 1941, And Events And Circumstances Relating Thereto. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.

[17] United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Intelligence (1977). CIA: The Pike Report. Nottingham: Spokesman Books for the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

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2 Responses to Utilization of Intelligence chapter 5

  1. Pingback: Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage, And Covert Operations, Part II | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting

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