Drone Wars

Title:                      Drone Wars

Author:                  Peter L. Bergen

Bergen, Peter L. (2015) and Daniel Rothenberg, eds. Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, And Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

LCCN:    2014020421

KZ6687 .D76 2015

Contents

  • Introduction / Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg — My guards absolutely feared drones : reflections on being held captive for seven months by the Taliban / David Rohde — The decade of the drone : analyzing CIA drone attacks, casualties, and policy / Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland — Just trust us : the need to know more about the civilian impact of U.S. drone strikes / Sarah Holewinski — The boundaries of war? Assessing the impact of drone strikes in Yemen / Christopher Swift — What do Pakistanis really think about drones? / Saba Imtiaz — It is war at a very intimate level / Drone pilot — This is not war by machine / Charles Blanchard — Regulating drones : are targeted killings by drones outside traditional battlefields legal? / William C. Banks — A move within the shadows : will JSOC’s control of drones improve policy? / Naureen Shah.
  • Defending the drones : Harold Koh and the evolution of U.S. policy / Tara McKelvey — “Bring on the magic” : using drones in combat / Michael Waltz– The five deadly flaws of talking about emerging military technologies and the need for new approaches to law, ethics, and war / Peter W. Singer — Drones and cognitive dissonance / Rosa Brooks — Predator effect : A phenomenon unique to the War on Terror / Megan Braun — Disciplining drone strikes : just war in the context of counterterrorism / David True — World of drones : the global proliferation of drone technology / Peter L. Bergen and Jennifer Rowland — No one feels safe / “Adam Khan” — “Drones” : now and what to expect over the next ten years / Werner J. A. Dahm — From Orville Wright to September 11th : what the history of drone technology says about the future / Konstantin Kakaes — Drones and the dilemma of modern warfare / Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff — How to manage drones, transformative technologies, the evolving nature of conflict and the inadequacy of current systems of law / Brad Allenby — Drones and the emergence of data-driven warfare / Daniel Rothenberg.

Subjects

Date Updated:  August 26, 2016

Caveat. Perpendat itaque lector cavendum (civilis).[1]

Reviewed by James I. Walsh[2] (UNC Charlotte)

How are combat drones—armed, remotely piloted, combat aircraft—changing the nature of warfare? Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, takes up this important question by collecting essays and analyses from a diverse range of contributors. The book marks one of the first attempts to address the consequences of the military drone revolution in a comprehensive way, considering important ethical and legal implications as well as strategic and political consequences.

The collection is divided into four thematic sections. The first addresses the political and military consequences in countries where militants are targeted with drones, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. David Rohde, a Western reporter held hostage by the Haqqani militant group for over six months, describes in vivid detail how his captors feared drones and took steps to avoid detection by their sensors. Bergen and Jennifer Rowland next describe their important effort to collect open-source information on the location, target, and consequences in terms of militant and civilian deaths of each drone strike conducted by the United States outside of recognized theaters of war. Their dataset is a crucial resource for understanding the patterns of strikes and how the pace and targets of drone strikes have changed over time. A key challenge in collecting such data, however, is identifying the victims of drone strikes. Militants have incentives to exaggerate the degree to which civilians are killed by drones, while outsiders face powerful political and logistical barriers to both defining who is a “militant” as well as determining who is killed and injured by drone strikes. Sarah Holewinski takes up these issues in her contribution, arguing that greater transparency about how targeting decisions are made will help to ensure that the United States is properly held accountable for its actions. Christopher Swift and Saba Imtiaz discuss the domestic political impacts of drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan, respectively. Both hold that drones reverberate within existing political conflicts and that understanding the context of such conflicts is necessary for understanding the long-term consequences of relying on drones to counter militant groups. Both suggest that drone strikes might aggravate political divisions in both countries in ways that make countering militants more rather than less difficult.

Combat drones create novel challenges for international humanitarian law and international human rights law; the second set of contributions analyzes these challenges. Charles Blanchard, a former general counsel for the United States Air Force, emphasizes that drones are remotely piloted. Like more conventional weapons, such as piloted strike aircraft, drones are always under human control, and thus, he argues, capable of being subject to the same international and domestic rules that govern conventional use of force. William Banks’s chapter is a useful companion to Blanchard’s analysis, as it highlights how their regular deployment outside of recognized theaters of war and the capacity to target specific, known individuals in addition to groups of suspected enemy combatants challenges the laws of war. Naureen Shah suggests that these capabilities blur the lines between traditional military operations and intelligence operations, which in the United States are typically governed by different and less stringent oversight procedures than conventionally piloted strike aircraft.

The third major section of the book collects chapters that focus on the strategic and policy implications of drones. Peter Singer rightly notes that the technological development for drones, as well as other technologies, is rapidly outpacing our current capacity to govern and think through the ethical and legal implications of technological change; this is a point that Rosa Brooks develops in more detail. Megan Braun suggests that drone technology itself is not revolutionary but is part of a more gradual evolution of surveillance and precision weapons technologies. What is revolutionary, though, is the fact that drones have enabled a new policy of targeted killings, a change that is in some ways independent of drone technology and that raises important questions about the ethics of the use of force, discussed briefly by David True.

The book closes with considerations of how drone technology has and will continue to change the future of warfare. This section opens with an interview with an anonymous resident of Pakistan’s tribal areas, who stresses both how drones are quite accurate at hitting physical targets, such as building and vehicles, but at the same time create widespread anxiety among residents without a direct connection to militant groups. Werner J. A. Dahm speculates how drones might change in the future, while Konstantin Kakaes provides a short and fascinating history of the little-known development and use of drones since the early twentieth century. In their contributions, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, as well as Brad Allenby, hold that rather than considering how the development of drone technology will change society, we must consider how it interacts with social structures and laws to jointly determine the consequences of new weapons systems. The book closes with Rothenberg’s analysis of how surveillance and precision targeting technologies are allowing a fundamental shift in the use of force from targeting enemy formations to targeting specific individuals anywhere in the world.

Drone Wars, then, is a wide-ranging review of current thinking in policy and academic circles regarding the military, legal, and social consequences of the use of combat drones. But even a book as lengthy as this cannot alone provide in-depth discussion of all of the implications of this new military technology. For example, there is little assessment of how the publics in countries that use combat drones, such as the United States, Britain, and Israel, view this technology. Since drones lack on-board crews, they eliminate the possibility of physical harm to military personnel. Might it be the case that their ability to wage war without risking military casualties could lead mass publics and political parties to support conflicts more readily than in the past? The contributions to the book are heavy on law, technology, and public policy, and there is surprisingly little social-scientific, systematic assessment of the consequences of combat drones. No doubt this is a reflection of the fact that social scientists typically do not investigate an issue until sizable quantities of useful data are available. As drones become more frequently used both for combat but also for peaceful domestic purposes, political scientists, economists, and sociologists will begin to pay more attention to the social issues that they raise.

Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake[3]

The seven books reviewed as part of this installment’s “Current Topics” section focus on the use of drones to combat terrorism and terrorists. They are mostly documented by a combination of anonymous interviews and secondary sources, a factor worth keeping in mind.

The goal of minimizing casualties while inflicting maximum damage on the adversary is an accepted principle of war. With the invention of artillery, close combat warfare began a gradual decline. Tanks, airplanes, battleships, submarines, and ballistic missiles that targeted an unseen enemy each allowed the projection of lethal force while reducing human vulnerability. With the introduction of armed, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, this concept no longer applies, in the view of French philosopher Grégoire Chamayou. In A Theory of the Drone, he argues that the “projection of power…without projecting vulnerability implies that the only vulnerability will be that of the enemy, reduced to the status of mere target.” (p. 12) Just so, a military commander might respond. But Chamayou says the use of drones is a form of “Warfare without risk… [that] critically undermines the meta-legal principles that underpin the right to kill in war.” In short, he concludes, drones “accommodate the right to targeted assassination…” and that in turn risks the possibility that the “subjects of a drone-state” may become that “state’s own population.” (p. 18)

With this background, Chamayou reviews the genealogy of the Predator UAV, its claimed uses for surveillance, and its lethal applications aimed at “the legitimization of drone homicide.” He also examines the psychological stress on those in the target area and “the psychic agony of drone operators” while dismissing the “PlayStation mentality” argument expressed by some pilots to explain their risk-free combat immunity. (p. 106) There is also a chapter on drone precision, in which Chamayou quotes former CIA Director Leon Panetta: “It was very precise and is very limited in terms of collateral damage.” In response, after making a comparison with the Dresden bombing and Hiroshima in WWII, he dismisses the analogy without elaboration as an “erroneous commonplace … a veritable nest of conceptual confusions.” (p. 140)

Although A Theory of the Drone never postulates a specific theory, it does consider the philosophical implications of armed drones, invoking Hegel, Hobbs, and Sartre in complex arguments. These envision a future where this weapon may remove humans from supervision and create “a situation in which robots are capable of exerting lethal force without human control or intervention.” (p. 207) It is also clear that Chamayou finds drone warfare unethical while accepting other weapons of war that bomb targets with much less precision, entail greater civilian casualties and pilot risk, and incur higher system costs. His theory of drones leaves this dilemma to other philosophers.

The only theory found in Richard Whittle’s PREDATOR: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution is associated with the aeronautics of unmanned remotely controlled aerial vehicles. And while the book doesn’t contain any secrets, it does chronicle the evolution of the Predator and its predecessors, especially the Gnat 750.

The Gnat 750, writes Whittle, was the first UAV the CIA used to collect intelligence. In 1993, the then-newly confirmed CIA director, James Woolsey, held a meeting to discuss how to obtain aerial coverage of fighting in Bosnia. Satellites were too often blinded by cloud cover and the Serbs were careful to operate at night and at other times when satellites weren’t overhead. Woolsey asked his staff: “What about UAVs?” (p. 70) The agency had been experimenting with the Gnat 750—a drone with minimum reconnaissance capability. Woolsey sent Deputy Director of Operations Thomas Twetten to California to see whether the. Gnat 750 could loiter over a target below the clouds; it could, and after some modifications, it did. About the same time, at the urging of then-Pentagon procurement czar John Deutch, the Air Force signed a contract for an “endurance UAV” (p. 80) reconnaissance version of the Predator. For reasons of time, not all contractors had been allowed to bid; TRW, in a cameo appearance by TRW executive and former CIA officer Robert Kohler, complained, but Deutch overcame Kohler’s objections. In the end, while the results from both systems were impressive and warranted further development, the Predator prevailed,

PREDATOR describes the Air Force program that gradually improved the Predator’s capabilities. Located at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, the program office—nicknamed Big Safari—would develop laser target designator and infrared electro-optical capabilities, and later, communications links that would eventually allow real-time target monitoring in the United States.

Whittle writes that CIA began using the Predator after Charlie Allen, then-assistant director for collection, raised the idea with Richard Clarke, Clinton’s White House advisor. Clarke then suggested in a memo to senior Pentagon and CIA personnel that the “CIA fly the Predator to search for bin Laden.” Whittle writes that, although the option was opposed by those who preferred airplanes with pilots and by others who favored HUMINT, Clarke and Allen won the toss. (p. 147) Whittle’s account of how a Predator found and imaged bin Laden but operators couldn’t get White House permission to conduct an air strike (the Predator was unarmed at that time) makes frustrating reading.

The obvious next step was to arm the Predator and make the system operable from the United States. Whittle tells this part of the story in detail. He includes descriptions of the Air Force crews trained to pilot the Predator remotely, the group at CIA who fed them target data, and the proof-of-concept attack that killed al-Qa`ida leader Mohammed Atef.

The revolution in drone capabilities continued with more technological improvements, new drones, and greatly increased targeted killings, writes Whittle, “that raised a set of profound moral, legal, political, and practical questions.” (p. 302) He concludes that drones are here to stay, and “society needs to figure out how to cope with (the) implications.” (p. 305)

For those interested in how the drone program became an essential component of the war on terror, PREDATOR is a good source.

Andrew Cockburn’s Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins focuses on failed defense department and so-called CIA high-value target (HVT) armed drone operations that Cockburn labels targeted killings or assassinations; no theory here. To add perspective, he reviews the CIA’s failed attempts at assassination in the early Cold War and mistakenly includes the Phoenix program during Vietnam in the same category. Then he describes the origins of the military drone and the gradual improvements in technology and operational concepts that led to current capabilities. As to “targeted killings,” he includes a chapter on how they failed when applied to the post-Cold War “war on drugs.”

Kill Chain also discusses the CIA CounterTerrorism Center and its links to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). But the bulk of his story concentrates on the evolution of drone operations and the practical problems encountered in their unsuccessful efforts to eliminate HVTs. A key factor here is the reduction of “kill time”—from target acquisition to execution—which minimizes civilian casualties. Cockburn includes example after example where problems arose—in Afghanistan and Pakistan—to support his conclusion that drones are counterproductive, expensive, and immoral. (pp. 204, 221)

Kill Chain concludes with a discussion of “super-drones” in the planning stage and their susceptibility to Iranian or Chinese interference with the electronic command links. He notes that the solution to this problem is the “autonomous” drone, capable of conducting missions without human intervention that may “be just around the corner.” (p. 257) But he suggests that even these systems could be defeated by the same simple measures terrorists employ today to avoid drones.

While Cockburn acknowledges that armed drone warfare makes US personnel less vulnerable, he suggests their use is somehow “sinful.” A better solution, he proposes, is that drones be used for reconnaissance only.

In Sudden justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars, British investigative journalist Chris Woods takes a broader and more balanced view of drones that collect intelligence and execute armed missions. That is not to say that Woods avoids the controversies publicly associated with the armed Predator—”the world’s first airborne sniper rifle”—and its successor, the Reaper; he does not. (p. xii) But, reflecting on their performance, he acknowledges that “controversial though civilian casualties were, they were still fewer in number when compared to previous conflicts. The relative precision of armed drones… means that noncombatants were likely to be at less risk of death or injury than from most other weapon systems.” As collection systems, drones became “key assets… crucial to the intelligence revolution now taking place in warfighting.” (p. xv) Surprisingly, Woods reports, “despite the fearsome reputation of armed drones, their lethal use on the battlefield was at first uncommon… even in 2014 their focus still remained mostly on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).” (p. 2) And even when not armed, “drones helped facilitate attacks from other air assets.” (p. 3) Thus, in the war on terror that followed 9/11, Woods contends, “US foreign policy would increasingly shape itself to the Predator’s unique selling point—its effectiveness as an assassination tool.” (p. 27) Sudden Justice explains how this occurred despite domestic interagency mission conflicts and friction with the governments of the various countries where the targets were located.

Wood describes how the path that ended with an effective drone program began in the mid-1970s with an Israeli engineer, Abe Karem—”the Moses of modern drones”—who designed the Predator prototype in his Los Angeles garage. When the US government learned of Karem’s work, a “black” development contract was arranged through the Pentagon and later merged with a CIA program. (p. 33 ) By 1986, two prototypes had flown. At first, only reconnaissance capabilities were considered; these capabilities were used after 9/11 over Afghanistan. Woods describes the decision to arm the Predator with Hellfire missiles and the successful tests in mid-2001. Then he covers their routine use in targeted killings of al-Qa`ida leaders in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and eventually Yemen.

Of course these operations often resulted in public controversy—in some cases with the governments of the countries where the attacks occurred; in others, the issue was civilian casualties. Woods gives examples of these and deals at length with what he terms “prolonged virtual combat stress” (p. 187) that affected the drone pilots during a targeted killing operation, especially when target identity was in doubt or involved a US citizen.

Sudden Justice concludes with a reminder that many countries already have their own armed drones and that terrorist groups are likely to acquire them. The challenge ahead, he suggests, lies in convincing others “not to follow Washington’s own rule book.” (p. 288) His warning is well documented; a path to his solution remains problematical.

Unmanned: Drones, Data, and the Illusion of Perfect Warfare begins with a review of the current state of remotely controlled weapon systems. At the time of 9/11, author William Arkin writes, there were “fewer than 200 unmanned aerial vehicles—drones.” Today the military possesses “in addition to the some 500 in the Predator class…well over 11,000 other kinds of drones.” (p. 4). There are also numerous unmanned systems—land and sea—controlled by each of the military services. Arkin points out, “the United States is not the sole owner of unmanned vehicles: 88 other nations also operate drones, and 54 nations manufacture their own.” (p. 5) As a consequence, he suggests, many nonmilitary observers foresee a “nightmare of spying, and killer robots and autonomous decisionmakers.” In his judgment, this explains why the term “drone” has become “a sizzling curse word for some that invokes ethical failure and lawlessness.” (p. 6) In response to these critics, he points out that drone systems provide less risk and “ubiquitous surveillance and targeted killing that are necessary for security but also legal.” Do the critics, he asks, “really want more risk… less precision… and more casualties?” (p. 7)

Then, astonishingly, Arkin shoots down his own argument as “totally off the mark.” (p. 8) The real problem is with “drones and the Data Machine they serve.” They are “the greatest threat to our national security, our safety, and our way of life.” (p. 18) Unmanned attempts to explain these views in a first-person narrative that is alternatively informative and quirky. The quirkiness derives from Arkin’s insistence that “to understand drones you have to understand Gilgamesh,” the main character in The Epic of Gilgamesh, a 5,000-year-old literary work. Arkin devotes a chapter to the topic and then returns to it from time to time throughout the book. The connections remain obscure, however, and the story he tells of the life of the drone program is not enhanced by his references to Gilgamesh.

In the substantive parts of the book, Arkin tracks the development of drones and related unmanned vehicles that preceded the first operational remotely controlled system, the Predator. He explains their characteristics in detail and provides many examples of their use in the Middle East against high-value targets—not all successful—and some not presented in the other books reviewed here. He also describes the high-level politics involved and the interservice turf battles as, for example, the fight between the Air Force and the Army for “absolute control of the drone program.” The Army won and got what it needed—”intelligence.” (p. 161) But the theme of Unmanned that underlies all the factual and bureaucratic detail is the systemic automation involved, what Arkin calls the Data Machine, with “its vast collection of intelligence” and black boxes. This is the vital long-range threat, as he sees it, to the United States’ entire system of national security that is becoming autonomous and unmanned; “even our foreign policy itself is unmanned.” (p. 254)

Unmanned’s forecast of an excessively automated future, as implied in the final chapter of the sciencefiction example, is a dilemma left to the reader. The facts of the drone program presented, however, are worth attention.

“There is something about drones that makes people crazy. Some demonize drones, denouncing them for causing civilian deaths or enabling long-distance killing even as they ignore that fact that the same (or worse) could be said of many other weapons delivery systems.” (p. 230) “For many Americans, drones make all the sense in the world.” (p. 42) These observations from two articles in Drone Wars hint at the range of public views on the topic. Editors and contributors Peter Bergen, of the New America Foundation, and University of Arizona professor Daniel Rothenberg point out that “drones are the iconic military technology of the current conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.” But while their unique characteristics and appearance “have captured the public imagination” they have also resulted in divisive debates. (p. 1) The well written, thoughtful articles in Drone Wars weigh the military and civilian perspectives—American and foreign—on four of the principal categories associated with those debates: ground applications and consequences, legality and ethics, national security policy, and the future use of drones.

The impact of drones on civilians is a topic that pervades each category. A poignant account by “Adam Kahn” (a pseudonym), a Pakistani merchant in North Waziristan, conveys the effect drones have on the civilians who possess no direct connection to terrorism. At the other end of the civilian perspective spectrum, David Rohde, a former captive of Haqqani terrorists, records that, “My guards absolutely feared drones.” In a more general account of this issue, Sarah Holewinski discusses why civilians need to know more about the impact of drones on themselves. (pp. 42ff)

The topics of “targeted killings” and “assassination”—equally controversial issues—are addressed at length by William Banks, with an emphasis on their legality. Among other aspects discussed, in an attempt to remove ad hominem attacks from the debate, he suggests that the term “assassination” be applied to “unlawful killing” while reserving the term “targeted killing” for “premeditated acts of an individual by a government or its agents—which may, in fact, be permitted under US law.” (p. 137)

Other important topics found in Drone Wars include a history of drone technology with implications for the future of warfare, a review of “The Decade of the Drone” with a chronology, a chapter on the misconceptions about drones and their uses, “the Predator effect,” and the drone dilemmas of modern warfare with the emergence of data-driven warfare.

Those seeking a balanced d overview of this sensitive topic should read Drone Wars.

Despite the appearance of a Predator drone on the cover and the implications of its subtitle, Scott Horton’s Lords of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and America’s Stealth Warfare is a not book about drones. Its central theme is excessive secrecy in the executive branch, in general, and the CIA and NSA, in particular. The expression “lords of secrecy”—used throughout to annoying excess—is Horton’s catchphrase for the government leaders who uphold and perpetuate unjustifiable secrecy practices: This is not to say that Horton, a human rights lawyer, opposes secrecy in general; he does acknowledge “a legitimate, though limited, role for secrecy” in three areas—”advanced weapons sensitive systems… critical signals intelligence and cryptography… and the identity of covert and foreign informants.” (p. 179)

Horton strives to establish a basis for his positions by invoking Athenian precedents, the views of several German philosophers, and references to former US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The practical issues Horton discusses include the CIA conflict with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence over the rendition and enhanced interrogation programs, NSA and the Snowden leaks; the “conflict between whistleblowers and the lords of secrecy” and the growth “of authority and control of the lords of secrecy”; and the threat at drones “may trigger broader and more sustained warfare.” (pp. 24-5)

In his chapter on drones, Horton contends that “the lords of secrecy have. chosen a favorite weapon that helps identify and define their power. It is the Predator drone.” The one attribute of the drone that makes this passible is that “it is a consummately secret weapon.” (p. 110) Who doesn’t know about drone warfare? The.people of the United States.” (p. 122) This assertion may surprise those who have read some of the books reviewed above.

Horton argues that while drones seem to offer the possibility of “zero-casualty war” their use may in fact “create a slippery slope leading to continual or wider wars.” Moreover, there is the risk of civilian casualties or as Horton puts it, the devaluation of noncombatants.” (p. 112) From a legal perspective, he writes, “drones open the prospect for a new kind of war that includes targeted killings” that he categorizes as “extrajudicial,” far away from “ground or naval forces.” Other disadvantages include political difficulties with nations like Pakistan and the possibility that other nations will acquire similar capabilities. But, he asserts, the “most disquieting aspect of the drone program has to do with {the) secrecy” surrounding the drone program, especially in the case of “individual attacks” (p. 114) and the CIA’s putatively covert role in the post-9/11 warfare. Without suggesting any alternatives to current practices (beyond more transparency), he concludes, “the only real explanation that emerges is that the use of drones for sustained covert military activity serves the interests of the lords of secrecy.” (p. 128)

While Lords of Secrecy raises some genuine concerns regarding government secrecy, readers may well question Horton’s grasp of the drone program.

[1] On occasion, personal loyalties and opinions can be carved in stone and defended with a vengeance — at times with some venom thrown in. In these situations, the actual importance of the subject matter is dwarfed by the amount of aggression expressed. Retain a sense of proportion in all online and in-person discussions. [From The Intelligencer: Journal of U. S. Intelligence Studies.]

[2] Walsh, James I. (2015). Published on H-Diplo (August, 2015). Downloaded July 28, 2016. Walsh was at UNC Charlotte at the time of reviewing. Citation: James I. Walsh. Review of Bergen, Peter L.; Rothenberg, Daniel, eds., Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. August, 2015.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=43918

[3] Peake, Hayden, “Seven Books on Drones,” in The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies (22, 2, Spring 2016, pp. 115-119). The seven books are: Bergen, Peter L. (2015) and Daniel Rothenberg, eds. Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, And Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; Cockburn, Andrew (2015). Cockburn, Andrew (2015). Kill Chain: The Rise of The High-Tech Assassins. New York: Henry Holt and Co. Horton, Scott (2015). Lords of Secrecy: The National Security Elite And America’s Stealth Warfare. New York: Nation Books. Whittle, Richard (2014). Predator: The Secret Origins of The Drone Revolution. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Woods, Chris (2015). Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; Chamayou, Grégoire (2015), translated by Janet Lloyd. A Theory of The Drone. New York: The New Press; Arkin, William M. (2015). Unmanned: Drones, Data, And The Illusion of Perfect Warfare. New York: Little, Brown and Company. Hayden Peake is the Curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations. Most of these reviews appeared in recent unclassified editions of CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, Other reviews and articles may be found online at http://www.cia.gov

 

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5 Responses to Drone Wars

  1. Pingback: Kill Chain | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting

  2. Pingback: Predator | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting

  3. Pingback: Sudden Justice | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting

  4. Pingback: A Theory of The Drone | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting

  5. Pingback: Unmanned | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting

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