Title:                      Rezident

Author:                 Robert K. Baker

Baker, Robert K. (2015). Rezident: The Espionage Odyssey f Soviet General Vasily Zarubin. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse

LCCN:    2014914199


Date Posted:      March 27, 2017

Complied and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake[1]

If the era of the whistleblower didn’t begin on 7 August 1943, it was certainly presaged by an anonymous letter addressed to “Mr. Hoover” that arrived that day atFBI headquarters. Among other revelations, it named all the KGB (NKVD) of ficers serving in the Washington rezidency, including Vasily Zubilin (true name Zarubin), the Rezident responsible for KGB operations in America during World WarII.

FBI counterintelligence specialist and Russian linguist Robert Baker had been aware of the letter, and when it became public in 1995 it came to mind after he interviewed Zarubin’s daughter Zoya—herself a former KGB of ficer—in 1996 as part of his FBI duties. After his retirement in 1999, and with Zoya’s and her brother Peter’s cooperation, Baker began the research that resulted in Rezident.

Zarubin is well-known to enthusiasts of intelligence history for his frequently mentioned wartime service in the United States, where he coordinated the work of the Soviet Union’s spies. Baker tells the rest of Zarubin’s fascinating story. Born in 1894, he served in both the czar’s[2] army and the Red Army, from whence in 1919 he was recruited into the Cheka and rose to the rank of major general. In between, he was stationed in China, Finland, Demark (his first assignment and as an illegal), France, Germany, and his first duty in the United States (also as an illegal).

Zarubin managed to survive the Red Terror purges in the late 1930s. In 1940 he was assigned to a Polish prisoner of war camp near Katyn, where a mass execution of Polish of ficers took place. Baker found no evidence that Zarubin participated in the so-called Katyn massacre ordered by Stalin, as some have charged. (p. 351)

In July 1941, after the expulsion of the Soviet rezident in the United States—an interesting story in itself Zarubin arrived to replace him. For the next four years, accompanied by his third wife, Liza—also an

experienced NKVD officer, whose story Baker includes in some detail— the Zarubins worked diligently to run some of the most famous agents ever to serve the Soviet Union under the noses of the FBI.

Baker goes over Zarubin’s cases at length. The Moscow investigation that followed the receipt of the anonymous letter absolved Zarubin of malpractice but turned up an administrative problem that led to his recall in 1944. After a later investigation ended well, Zarubin was given awards and made deputy chief of the first chief directorate, where he served until retirement in 1948. Baker suggests retirement was not Zarubin’s choice but the result of one of Stalin’s anti-Jewish campaigns. (p. 552) After Stalin’s death, Zarubin periodically was called back to train new officers. He died in 1972 of a heart attack.

Rezident is thoroughly documented with Western and Russian sources—VENONA, books, and interviews—and supplemented with what Baker calls “administrative sections” that consider attributes of the Zarubin story that add background but can’t be firmly attributed. Baker also adds detailed historical descriptions of events surrounding Zarubin’s career that add helpful context. Baker has done a fine job showing how the KGB/NKVD functioned against its “imperialist” enemies through the life of one of its most effective officers.

[1] Hayden Peake in The Intelligencer (22, 2, Fall 2016, pp.  123-124).  Hayden Peake is the Curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations. Most of these reviews appeared in recent unclassified editions of CIA’s Studies in Intelligence. Other reviews and articles may be found online at

[2] I prefer “Tsar”.

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The Israeli Secret Services And The Struggle Against Terrorism

Title:                      The Israeli Secret Services And The Struggle Against Terrorism

Author:                 Ami Pedahzur

Pedahzur, Ami v(2009). The Israeli Secret Services And The Struggle Against Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press

LCCN:    2008025949

HV6433.I75 P47 2009


  • The emergence of Israel’s counterterrorism doctrine — The path to the defensive model and back — Rescuing hostages — The Lebanese puzzle — New challenges from the West Bank and Gaza — The global challenge of Iran and Hezbollah — New rivals, old responses — A war against an elusive enemy — The second Lebanon war and beyond — Fighting the terrorism plague.


Date Posted:      March 27, 2017

Reviewed by Yehuda J. Lev[1]

Having read quite a few books on security and terrorism, topics that fascinated me during my civil service career with the Government of Israel, I was looking with interest for an Israeli author with an impressive security background that would for once provide balanced criticism of the Israeli counterterrorism struggle.

I believe that Mr. Pedahzur has done justice to this topic in his book, The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism, despite the fact that his service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was much like mine: he was a medic. Mr. Pedahzur is not an acclaimed, retired warrior from Mossad (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, one of three main Israeli entities tasked mostly with activities outside of Israel), or Shabak (an acronym for the General Security Service, known also as Shin Bet, which specializes in intelligence gathering within Israel and the occupied territories, but occasionally operates in Israel’s neighboring countries). And yet his book is well written and superbly researched, and reads almost like a thriller. In my own career, I served in the Israel National Police (INP) and in various assignments that allowed me more than a fleeting peek into the Israeli Intelligence Community (IC). I was pleasantly surprised to find this book finally tells the truth about a painful and problematic topic: Israel’s struggle with terrorism.

Pedahzur has not just written another book about Israel and its six decades of being plagued (mostly) by Palestinian terrorism. He takes the reader through the country’s history since the end of World War I, a war in which Jews aided the Allies by spying on forces of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Israel gained its independence in 1948, and since then its history has been marked by a struggle with terrorism. Pedahzur attempts to observe this effort mostly from the war model, which also reflects the counterterrorism policies of the United States and other countries. The “war model,” or “War on Terror,” deals with policies that increasingly have undermined civil liberties and human rights, and at the same time evaded or ignored the underlying causes of terrorism, thus increasing the terrorist threat. This model deals mostly with the involvement of various IDF Special Forces units, and how they were deployed against what essentially is seen as revolutionary, or guerrilla, warfare. Pedahzur, however, is careful to omit almost no one who takes part in the counterterrorism struggle, and when applicable observes it from two other perspectives: judiciary, which deals with terrorism as a criminal act, and reconciliatory, which handles it through politics and diplomacy.

Israeli politicians and leaders are quite often prominent figures who have retired from the IDF or IC; thus, there is little wonder that for over sixty years the country has dealt with terrorism using the war model. One of Pedahzur’s observations is that Israel’s reputation as one of the best, most experienced terrorism opponents may not entirely be deserved. In an undated interview, he posed the question of why terrorism against Israelis has intensified and become more deadly over the years if Israel is indeed such a counterterrorism superpower. Pedahzur proposes that time and again the policymakers erred by using various military commando units, barely trained in counterterrorism warfare, instead of a superbly trained police counterterrorism commando group such as the Special Police Unit Yehidat Mishtara Meyiuhedet (or Yamam, by which I was trained in several counternarcotics operations). Until recently, Yamam was always second to one of the IDF surveillance commando units (Sayarot). Pedahzur covers the everyday tasks of the units belonging to the Army Military Intelligence (Sayeret Matkal), and a variety of other special military units, including Mossad. He explains each unit’s routine duties, as well as its performance in counterterrorism operations. Through detailed descriptions of specific hijackings, kidnappings, and hostage situations, Pedahzur illustrates the success or failure of the unit(s) that took part in the operation, and describes the action’s place in Israeli history.

I feel obligated to say that even sage Israelis frequently harbor incorrect conceptions of the participation and performance of these units in counterterrorism situations. Moreover, they are often wrong about which unit was involved in a certain operation. For example, after the Ma’alot hostage crisis on May 15, 1974, it was widely published that Sayeret Golani conducted the assault, when in reality, as Pedahzur notes, Sayeret Matkal carried it out. Another example of erroneous information involved the 1976 hostage rescue effort at Entebbe, during which Yoni Netanyahu, commander of the ground assault troops, was shot in the throat and died almost instantly. The media glorified his death, claiming he was shot in the chest and died over an hour later while being aided by a doctor and surrounded by his warriors. It is widely accepted that the Israeli media are truthful but naturally somewhat biased, so sometimes might not disclose all the known facts and thus leave room for speculation. Dover Tzahal, official IDF spokesman, carefully avoids outright lies, but at times issues only partially true statements. He and the civil media seem to have tacitly agreed to delay or suppress certain national security-related facts. Only a minimal number of state security-related news articles are suppressed, but Dover Tzahal’s announcements have the highest credibility and exert the strongest influence on public opinion. After any successful or failed counterterrorism operation, it is usually Tzahal who breaks the news.

Pedahzur concludes that the long-term aim of destroying Palestinian terrorism was not only unsuccessful, but led to intensified terrorist attacks. He also states that Israel has been only partially successful in deterring enemy attacks. The author claims “the psychological effect (of Israeli combat expertise) on Palestinian and Lebanese fighters was of no great consequence. Not only were they not deterred from continuing to strike at Israel, but their efforts also intensified over the years…” (p. 6). Other counterterrorism experts have asserted that Israel’s military and political bureaucracies have been far too slow in adapting to changes within terrorist organizations, and thus have coped poorly with splinter cells and small terrorist groups—even with larger entities such as Hizbollah and Hamas. As a result, relatively small terrorist organizations with limited funding can terrorize Israel, especially with weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the country has been slow to develop technology and urban warfare tactics for combating terrorists, despite the fact that its military industry is one of the most fertile in the world.

I would like to briefly compare the results of Israel’s counterterrorism efforts and those of the United States in Afghanistan following 9/11. As stated earlier, over the six decades of its existence Israel has fought terrorism with limited results. It has suppressed terrorism periodically, but never conclusively. Similarly, the United States—after ten long years of battling the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the world with a large modern army, including special units and innovative technology—has failed to liquidate Afghan terrorism. Most analysts claim that al-Qaida has been dramatically weakened and splintered. Yet today it affiliates itself with other Salafi terrorist groups that have taken part in an unknown number of post-9/11 attacks, such as the 2004 railroad bombing in Spain, the 2005 subway bombing in the UK, and the foiled 2006 plan to simultaneously blow up ten aircraft on their way to the United States. Hundreds of thousands of Salafi and Shia Muslims worldwide fund and support Middle Eastern, East African, and Asian terrorist groups, as well as international al-Qaida and other Salafist groups. The notion of defeating America, as well as annihilating Israel and all Jews, is almost invariably sounded.

Israeli and American efforts to liquidate terrorism have thus far failed. Pedahzur correctly sees terrorism as a psychological tactic aimed at the public, which in turn influences leaders and decision makers through electoral pressure. A fast and devastating response to a terrorist attack serves to reassure the public, possibly moderately boosting morale. Besides being a temporary “Band-Aid,” however, such responses truly benefit only the political leaders (p. 8).

The public’s influence does not stop with politicians. It trickles down to the intelligence community and military and plays an important role in funding and disbursement. Pedahzur explains this well in relation to Israel’s IC and military units deployed in counterterrorism efforts. The issue is better understood in terms of the constant turf fighting among elements of the Israeli counterterrorism community. The special ops units of the IDF and IC are secrecy-oriented. Most of their operations are so secret, in fact, that the units almost never receive overt credit for their success. Counterterrorism is a field in which participation and success hit the media very quickly, and thus the unit gets its credit much in the fashion of the U.S. Navy Seals following the liquidation of Usama bin Ladin. Hence, the military units compete with one another. This competition is also prevalent among Shabak, the Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman), Mossad, and, to a much lesser extent, the police, whose role was not mentioned in this book despite the fact that police investigators routinely participated in the arrests and interrogation of terror suspects at least until 1991 (when I left the INP). The immediate outcome of this competition among intelligence units and organizations is the familiar unwillingness to share knowledge and cooperate.

Pedahzur is correct in stating that this unfortunate feature of the Israeli IC can have a devastating influence on the struggle against terrorism. Even though certain lessons of 9/11 have been learned and changes made in the American IC, cooperation and information sharing have been limited. This “malaise” among security services is common in most democracies, and unlikely to be completely resolved. Although this unhealthy competition may distract security organizations from their original tasks involving state security and undermine national strategic interests, some may view such competition as a sign of healthy agility. I do not.

[1] Yehuda J. Lev, in Journal of Strategic Security (5, 1, Spring 2012, pp. 85-88). Lev is Lieutenant Colonel, Israel National Police (Retired)Recommended Citation: Lev, Yehuda J.. “The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism by Ami Pedahzur. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).” Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 1 (2012): 85-88. DOI: Available at:

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CIA: Covert Operations, Chapter 19

Title:                      CIA: Covert Operations, Chapter 19

Author:                  Paul W. Blackstock

Blackstock, Paul W. (1978) and Frank L. Schaf, Jr. “Chapter 19: “CIA: Covert Operations”. Detroit: Gale Research Co.

LCCN:    74011567

Z6724.I7 B55


Intelligence service–Bibliography.


Subversive activities–Bibliography.

Date Updated:  March 27, 2017


Agee, Phillip (1975). Inside the Company: A CIA Diary. New York: Stonehill

Ayers, Bradley Earl (1976, 1979). The War That Never Was. Canoga Park, CA: Major Books

Cooper, Chester L. (1970). The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam, with a Foreword By W. Averell Harriman. New York: Dodd, Mead

Corson, William R. (1968). The Betrayal. New York: W. W. Norton

Cox, Arthur M. (1975). The Myths of National Security: The Peril of Secret Government. Boston: Beacon Press

Fitzgerald, Frances (1972, 2002). Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. Boston, MA: Little, Brown

Gravel, Mike (1971-2), Noam Chomsky, and Howard Zinn. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam (The Senator Gravel edition – 5 vols.). Boston, Beacon Press

Halberstam, David (1972, 2001). The Best And The Brightest; foreword by John McCain. New York : Modern Library

Hilsman, Roger (1967). To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in The Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday

Hunt, E. Howard (1973). Give Us This Day. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House

Phillips, David Atlee (1977). The Night Watch: Careers in Secret Operation. New York: Atheneum

Prouty, L. Fletcher (1973, 2008). The Secret Team: The CIA And Its Allies In Control Of The United States And The World. New York: Skyhorse Pub

Village Voice, “The Report on the CIA that President Ford Doesn’t. Want You to Read.” The Village Voice, (11 February 1976. pp. 1-21; and in a supplement to The Village Voice, (16 February 1976, pp. 1-24. Reprinted in a Special Supplement to The Village Voice under the title, “The Pike Papers: House Select Committee on Intelligence CIA Report.” (October 1976)

The Village Voice, a weekly New York newspaper, published excerpts of the secret final report of the investigations into the U.S. intelligence community of the House of Representatives Select Committee on intelligence (Rep. Otis G. Pike of New York chairman). The 338-page secret report was provided to The Village Voice editor by Daniel Schorr, veteran CBS correspondent, who repeatedly refused to name his source of the report—even under Congressional pressure. The excerpts printed by The Village Voice detail performance of the intelligence community during crisis periods such as the Tet Offensive of the Vietnam War, the Mid-East wars, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets, and Indian-Pakistan War. Also reprinted are accounts of the financial activities of the community and the covert action activities of the CIA.

Rositzke, Harry August (1988). CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action. Boulder, CO: Westview Press

Smith, Joseph Burkholder (1976). Portrait of A Cold Warrior. New York: Putnam’s Sons

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs (1975). United States and Chile during the Allende years, 1970-1973: hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.

United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1976). Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders : An Interim Report Of The Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, United States Senate : Together With Additional, Supplemental, And Separate Views (foreword by Clark R. Mollenhoff ; introd. by Senator Frank Church). New York: Norton

United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1975). Covert action in Chile, 1963-1973: staff report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate. Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1976). Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to the Intelligence Activities United States Senate, Hearings Before the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of U.S. Senate. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Book I. Foreign and Military Intelligence.

                                Book I. Foreign and Military Intelligence

                Book IV. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence

Wise, David (1973). The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power. New York: Random House

Wise, David, “The Secret Committee Called ‘40.’New York Times, (19 January 1975, p. 54).

Wise, author of several books on U.S. intelligence and government deception, describes the role of the 40 Committee of the National Security Council in approving covert actions to be taken by the CIA’s clandestine services. He names the membership of the committee and also traces some of its history from 1948.


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Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy

Title:                      Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy

Author:                 Eamon Javers

Javers, Eamon (2010). Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: Inside The Secret World of Corporate Espionage. New York, NY: Harper

LCCN:    2009031010

HD38.7 .J38 2010


  • A shocking exposé of the sordid world of corporate espionage and its historic cast, including Allan Pinkerton, the nation’s first “private eye,” tycoons and playboys, presidents and FBI operatives, CEOs and accountants, Cold War veterans and military personnel, and Howard Hughes’ private CIA.


  • Code name: Yucca — Part I: — From Bogus Island to Deep Chocolate — A high and honorable calling — For the money — The man is gone — Thug busters — The chocolate war — Part II: — Techniques, technologies, and talent — Tactical behavior assessment — The Eddie Murphy strategy — Nick no-name — They’re all kind of crazy — Is this a great country, or what? — In form the cold.


Date Posted:      March 24, 2017

Reviewed by Devin Leonard[1]

It’s easy to understand how Washington reporters can become jaded. They are constantly being spun by the same gang of politicians and lobbyists who dominate the nation’s capital.

So, by his own admission, Eamon Javers, a veteran Washington correspondent who now covers the White House for Politico, was thrilled when he stumbled on a new cast of characters in the area: former spies who peddle their services to large companies.

The result is Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage, Mr. Javers’s account of how he doggedly tracked down rent-a-spies in United States and Europe and tried to get them to divulge their mysteries.

The author obtained quite a few meetings with former C.I.A., MI5 and K.G.B. agents who comb through trash and snoop on people using satellite technology, on behalf of the private sector. He says their business is booming, although he isn’t sure if this is good for the world.

Mr. Javers warns, “In an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment, the balance seems to be shifting away from governments and toward corporate and even private individuals, who have access to more intelligence and information-gathering abilities than many governments in history ever had.”

At the same time, it’s impossible for the reader not to notice how the author flatters his subjects. Mike Baker, a former C.I.A. man and one of the founders of Diligence LLC, reminds him of Kevin Bacon with his “spiky hair and boyish good looks.”

Mr. Javers has similar praise for Johann Benöhr, a German corporate investigator (whom the author includes even though he didn’t come from the world of government spying): “With his shaved head, two-day stubble and sleek suit, Benöhr could pass for a slimmer version of the actor Vin Diesel.”

If only the subjects reciprocated. For the most part, they say little that they wouldn’t publish in their marketing brochures. Mr. Javers lets them boast about their bankable skills. But they don’t identify their clients or the targets of their investigations—even when he grants several of them anonymity.

A former British special services officer regales Mr. Javers with stories about how he follows executives as they pick up transvestites, and uses laser microphones to eavesdrop on conversations. Is there any way for the reader to be sure that any of this actually happened? Alas, no. “That’s a frequent problem with asking questions in the world of global private intelligence,” Mr. Javers shrugs. “Sometimes, it’s impossible to know the truth.”

Nevertheless, he treats much of what his beloved spies say as gospel. In that sense, Mr. Javers is a useful tool for them. The spies have good reason to provide a peek into their world: if he extols them, they might win new business. But at the same time, they don’t want to say anything that might alienate their existing accounts.

Mr. Javers is not unsympathetic. “Corporate intelligence firms have to hustle for new clients,” he writes. “But this can be tricky when the work product, and the techniques that produce it, are confidential. Often the secret is to show prospective clients just a glimpse of what a firm can do—and dazzle them with behind-the-scenes tales of spycraft.”

This, of course, is exactly what the spies in the book are doing with its author; it’s not entirely clear that he understands.

There is another reason that former government agents prefer to keep their activities shrouded in darkness. The more they reveal about their tricks, the more they look like ordinary gumshoes rather than international men and women of mystery. That’s not a way for them to sell their services to clients.

Mr. Javers spends several pages talking about how Diligence’s co-founders—Nick Day, a former British military operative, and Mike Baker, the Baconesque ex-C.I.A. officer—were able to raise money and attract political luminaries to their board.

But the firm appears less impressive in the field. Mr. Javers gushes about Project Yucca, a caper in which he says Mr. Day pretended to be a guy named Nick Hamilton and persuaded an unsuspecting KPMG accountant, after drinks in a Bermuda restaurant, to slip him confidential documents about a Bermuda-based fund for one of Diligence’s corporate clients.

But, the book goes on to say, Project Yucca unraveled in 2005 when someone sent photocopies of the papers to KPMG’s office in Montvale, N.J. In the end, it sounds more like the handiwork of Austin Powers than of James Bond.

After all his ringing of alarms, you might expect Mr. Javers to come down hard on the rent-a-spy trade. But he just suggests that its members be required to register with the government, as lobbyists must do. “It’s time for the spy firms to come in from the cold,” he says.

It’s not clear how this would slow the shift of investigative power from the government to the private sector that Mr. Javers is so justifiably concerned about. But spies and journalists have often had a symbiotic relationship. Generally, it involves the former using the latter to advance their interests.

Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy seems to be only the latest example.

[1] Devin Leonard, “The Corporate Side of Snooping,” The New York Times (March 6, 2010), downloaded March 24, 2017. A version of this review appears in print on March 7, 2010, on Page BU9 of the New York edition with the headline: “The Corporate Side of Snooping”.

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Quantitative Intelligence Analysis

Title:                      Quantitative Intelligence Analysis

Author:                  Edward Waltz

Waltz, Edward (2014). Quantitative Intelligence Analysis: Applied Analytic Models, Simulations And Games. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

LCCN:    2014027175

JF1525.I6 W395 2014


  • The intelligence analyst and synthesis — Modeling in intelligence — Mental models in intelligence analysis — Translating mental models to explicit sharable models — Explicit models in structured and quantitative analysis — Explicit models of analytic thinking — Explicit models of the targets of analysis — Analytic wargaming in intelligence — Model-based support to collection and operations — Implementing the discipline of explicit quantitative modeling and analytic gaming.


Date Posted:      March 24, 2017

Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake[1]


In his foreword to Quantitative Intelligence Analysis, former DDI and NIC chairman John Gannon observes that, “In my early years as an analyst and manager…individual brainpower and expertise were the coin of the realm. Methodological approaches, by contrast, assumed time-consuming and credit-sharing collaboration, which was less valued.” He sums up the situation saying, “This undercurrent of resistance to tools and techniques both from individual analysts and the bureaucracy itself, was endemic in the Community into the 1990s.” (p. xx)[2]

Since then, the advancing information age and the high volume of data involved in analysis has imposed changes in that approach. Today, Intelligence Community analysts routinely employ state-of-the-art, structured analytic techniques such as those described by Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson.[3] “Brain-power,” writes Gannon, “is now viewed as enhanced by the rigor of modeling, dynamic simulations, and interactive games that are the wave of the Intelligence Community’s collaborative future.” (p. xxii)

In Quantitative Intelligence Analysis, Dr. Edward Waltz, a senior researcher at Virginia Tech University who has studied these new methods, provides the conceptual background and illustrates the practical application of these techniques in the form of models. The models Waltz has devised “refer to the detailed and often technical descriptions or representations of the analysts’ thinking” about the subjects with which he is confronted. (p. 1)

Waltz defines the models in the analyst’s mind as implicit and those in words, graphics, or on a computer terminal as explicit. He goes on to explain their limitations—how implicit mental models are transformed into explicit computer models, and how they are applied to intelligence problems. The models discussed are illustrated with graphic representations and narrative explanations of what the analyst is thinking or the computer is executing. Then he devotes chapters to show how they are used in target analysis, wargaming, and collection operations that illustrate the power they confer on collaborative work and how teams interact. He offers “case studies” to clarify the process.

A word of caution is warranted here: the procedures illustrated by graphic representations are rather complex. Moreover, the case studies are very general, which is to say that this is not a primer. The quantitative aspect of the book refers to mathematical probability and statistical methods used to evaluate data, but for the most part no detailed explanation of the underlying mathematics is included. He only describes their functions. (p. 131)

Quantitative Intelligence Analysis is not a step-by-step, how-to book and is probably best suited for the  classroom or for experienced analysts who haven’t employed these techniques in their work. But it does demonstrate the complexity of modern analytic procedures; the potential value of team analysis; and the extensive technical support now required compared to the John Gannon era. In that sense it reveals what modern intelligence analysis has become.

[1] Peake, Hayden in The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies (22, 3, Winter 2016-17, pp. 121-122). Hayden Peake is the Curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations. Most of these reviews appeared in recent unclassified editions of CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, Other reviews and articles may be found online at

[2] See Jack Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” at from his chapter in George, Roger Z. (2014) and James B. Bruce, eds. Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, which describes his view of the pressures on analysts that have led to biased analyses.

[3] Richards J. Heuer Jr. (2011) and Randolph H. Pherson. Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis . Washington, DC: CQ Press

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Operation Thunderbolt

Title:                      Operation Thunderbolt

Author:                  Saul David

David, Saul (2015). Operation Thunderbolt: Flight 139 And The Raid on Entebbe Airport, The Most Audacious Hostage Rescue Mission in History. New York: Little, Brown and Company

LCCN:    2015946917

DS119.7 .D2977 2015


  • “The definitive account of one of the greatest Special Forces missions ever, the Raid on Entebbe, by acclaimed military historian Saul David”–Book jacket.
  • “On June 27, 1976, a group of Arab and German terrorists hijacked Air France flight 139 en route from Tel Aviv to Paris. The plane was diverted to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where the terrorists demanded the release of fifty-three “freedom fighters” in Israeli, Kenyan, and European jails in return for the safe release of the 253 passengers and crew. Idi Amin, whose murderous rule of Uganda was then in its fifth year, made no attempt to intervene. After most of the non-Israeli hostages had been released, Israel faced an impossible choice: give in to terrorism or risk a rescue that had a high chance of failure. In the wake of the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, this decision was almost incalculably difficult. As Saul David recounts in this reconstruction of one of the most complex Special Forces missions ever, Operation Thunderbolt required more than just tactical audacity. In a mere two days, three of the most important men in Israeli history–Ehud Barak, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Rabin–marshaled resources, secured necessary international partners, and masterminded the raid that would astonish the world. This book gives us the first comprehensive account, using classified documents from archives in tour countries and interviews with key participants, including Israeli soldiers and politicians, hostages, and a former terrorist. The result brings to life the role that ingenuity and bravery can play against even the most impossible odds and the most committed opponents.”–Book jacket.


  • Day 1. Sunday, 27 June 1976 — Day 2. Monday, 28 June 1976 — Day 3. Tuesday, 29 June 1976 — Day 4. Wednesday, 30 June 1976 — Day 5. Thursday, 1 July 1976 — Day 6. Friday, 2 July 1976 — Day 7. Saturday, 3 July 1976 — Day 8. Sunday, 4 July 1976 — Aftermath.



  • Originally published in Great Britain by Hodder & Stoughton, July 2015

Date Updated:  March 27, 2017

Complied and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake[1]

On Sunday 27 June 1976, Air France flight 139 left Ben-Gurion International Airport in Israel, where security was notoriously tight and landed in Athens, Greece, where security was notoriously light. By the time the plane left for Paris, the 283 passengers had been joined by a team of hijackers led by two German terrorists linked to the anti-fascist Baader-Meinhof gang. Once airborne, they forced the pilot to divert to the Entebbe airport in Uganda. There, the Jewish passengers became hostages, while the others were sent on to Paris. With Ugandan President Idi Amin’s complicity, the terrorists demanded the release of colleagues already in Israeli jails. Israel’s policy was not to negotiate with terrorists. Seven days later, the hostage takers were dead and all but three of the Jewish hostages were back in Israel. Operation Thunderbolt fills in the details.

If this sequence of events rings a bell, it is because a movie was made of the event and many books have been written about the operation—five in the past six years alone. What, then, justifies this one? There are several reasons. It is an exciting, well-told story that keeps a reader’s attention through the step-by-step planning and execution of the rescue attempt. More important, historian Saul David better illuminates the political controversies among Israeli president Yitzhak Rabin and his defense minister, Shimon Peres, and other participants in the operation. And finally, David supports his story with diaries, interviews with the surviving hostages, and official documents recently released.

As might be imagined, worldwide public reaction to the rescue was positive, except, of course, in Muslim and some African countries; official government responses, however, were not. David discusses attempts to condemn the operation in the UN and Britain’s refusal to send a message of congratulations, as had Germany, France, and Switzerland, among others. The United States, writes David, had it both ways: President Ford sent a message expressing his “great satisfaction,” while the State Department was upset that Israel had broken its agreement not to use military equipment supplied by the United States, in this case the C-130 aircraft, outside Israel. (p. 349)

David provides hints at the role Israeli intelligence played. He notes that an “informant” drew a “map to mark the spot” where the murdered hostage Dora Bloch was buried; a copy of the map is included in the book. (p. 360) Then evidence surfaced that Amin had ordered her execution while at the same time claiming she had been returned with the other hostages. At this point, Britain broke relations with Uganda. The mysterious death of Wadie Haddad—the sponsor of the hijacking—was not due to an incurable disease (as was claimed), but rather, according to one account, the work of Mossad and a box of poisoned Belgian chocolates (his favorites) he consumed.[2]

In the end, David asks, did Operation Thunderbolt “make it harder for Israeli politicians to push through compromises required for peace”—even though it saved lives? (p. 373) He leaves the answer to history.

[1] Hayden Peake in The Intelligencer (22, 2, Fall 2016, p. 123).  Hayden Peake is the Curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations. Most of these reviews appeared in recent unclassified editions of CIA’s Studies in Intelligence. Other reviews and articles may be found online at

[2] Pedahzur, Ami v(2009). The Israeli Secret Services And The Struggle Against Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press


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OSS—The U.S. Office of Strategic Service, Chapter 18

Title:                      OSS—The U.S. Office of Strategic Service, Chapter 18

Author:                 Paul W. Blackstock

Blackstock, Paul W. (1978) and Frank L. Schaf, Jr. “Chapter 18: “OSS—The U.S. Office of Strategic Service”. Detroit: Gale Research Co.

LCCN:    74011567

Z6724.I7 B55


Intelligence service–Bibliography.


Subversive activities–Bibliography.

Date Updated:  March 24, 2017

Chapter 18

Until recently (1976) historians and political scientists have been denied access to the OSS archives so that there is no comprehensive work on the OSS comparable to Foot’s book on the British SOE, SOE in France[1]. The CIA is the custodian of the OSS files and recently, under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act, has made some documents available to authors preparing books on the OSS. The CIA declassified, in 1976, the War Report of the Office of Strategic Services (see Anthony Cave Brown’s The Secret War Report of The OSS[2]), and in another case the CIA has released more than 200 documents to an ex-OSS member who is writing about his experiences in Hanoi. Brown’s The Secret War Report of The OSS and Richard Harris Smith’s OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency[3] are the standouts in authoritative and helpful OSS literature. Much of the remainder consists of memoirs or accounts of individual episodes or adventures.


Alsop, Stewart (1946, 1964) and Thomas Braden. Sub Rosa: The OSS And American Espionage. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World

Asprey, Robert B. (1975). War in The Shadows: The Guerrilla In History. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday

Cave Brown, Anthony (1976) ed. The Secret War Report of The OSS. New York: Berkley

Ford, Corey (1946) and Maj. Alastair McBain. Cloak And Dagger; The Secret Story of OSS. New York: Random House

Hymoff, Edward (1972). The OSS in World War II. New York: Ballantine Books

Smith, R. Harris (2005). OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press


Ford, Corey (1970). Donovan of OSS. New York: Little, Brown

Hall, Roger  (1957, 2004). You’re Stepping on My Cloak And Dagger. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press

Icardi, Aldo (1956). Aldo Icardi, American Master Spy. New York, University Books

Kaufman, Louis (1974, 1975) Barbara Fitzgerald, and Tom Sewell. Moe Berg: Athlete, Scholar, Spy. Boston: Little, Brown

Phillips, William (1952). Ventures in Diplomacy. North Beverly?, MA: Priv. print.

Taylor, Edmond (1969, 1971). Awakening From History. London: Chatto & Windus


Alcorn, Robert Hayden (1965). No Banners, No Bands; More Tales Of The OSS. New York: D. McKay

Alcorn, Robert Hayden (1962). No Bugles for Spies: Tales of the OSS. New York: David McKay

Booth, Waller B. (1972). Mission Marcel-Proust; The Story of An Unusual OSS Undertaking. Philadelphia: Dorrance

Downes, Donald (1953). The Scarlet Thread: Adventures in Wartime Espionage. London: Derek Vershoyle

Dulles, Allen (1947, 2000). Germany’s Underground. New York: Da Capo Press

Dulles, Allen W. (1966). The Secret Surrender. New York: Harper and Row. [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967].

Klein, Alexander (1958) The Counterfeit Traitor. New York: Holt

Morgan, William J. (1955). Spies and Saboteurs. London: Gollancz

Murray, Henry A. (1948) and the OSS assessment staff. Assessment of Men : Selection of Personnel for The Office of Strategic Services. New York: Rinehart

Tompkins, Peter (1966). Italy Betrayed. New York: Simon and Schuster

Tompkins, Peter (1965). The Murder of Admiral Darlan, A Study In Conspiracy. New York, Simon and Schuster

Tompkins, Peter (1962). A Spy in Rome. New York: Simon and Schuster


The OSS operated in the China-Burma:-India theater of operations and in Ceylon, Thailand, and Indochina. In China there was some controversy when the OSS started up activities after other organizations had already organized for intelligence and guerrilla operations. Some insight into these problems is provided in Milton Miles’s A Different Kind of War[4] (cited in chapter 6) and in Roy O. Stratton’s SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy[5]. In the part of the Pacific theater of operations commanded by MacArthur, the OSS was virtually excluded from setting up detachments. Supposedly MacArthur already had his espionage and sabotage and guerrilla operations well in hand in his Allied Intelligence Bureau, and in any case MacArthur resisted in his area organizations that reported directly to Washington and not to him. The best single source of material on the tangled webs of controversy and the best expose of OSS activity in China, India, Indochina, Burma, Ceylon, and Thailand is Richard Harris Smith’s OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency[6], especially chapters 8 through 10 (see section A, this chapter).

Barrett, David D. (1970). Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California

Peers, William R. (1963) and Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most Successful Guerrilla Force. Boston: Little, Brown

[1] Foot, M.R.D. (1966). SOE In France: An Account of The Work of British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-1944. London: H.M. Stationery Off

[2] Cave Brown, Anthony (1976) ed. The Secret War Report of The OSS. New York: Berkley

[3] Smith, R. Harris (2005). OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press

[4] Miles, Milton (1967). A Different Kind of War: The Little-Known Story of The Combined Guerrilla Forces Created in China by The U.S. Navy And The Chinese During World War II. Garden City, NY: Doubleday

[5] Stratton, Roy Olin (1950). SACO—The Rice Paddy Navy. Pleasantville, NY: C. S. Palmer

[6] Smith, R. Harris (2005). OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press

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